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Chapter I     
Introduction 
Recently, the issue of corporate governance has caught much more attention from companies and 
investors, to government authorities, organizations and securities exchanges across countries.  
There are several reasons for this attentiveness.  One is the recent proliferation of corporate and 
accounting scandals aroused around the world.  And the other is as a research indicates: better 
corporate governance frameworks would benefit firms through greater access to financing, lower 
cost of capital, better firm performance, and more favorable treatment of all stakeholders.1  And 
this gives corporations great incentives to establish and maintain good mechanism of corporate 
governance structure for business operation. 
Generally, the U.S. corporate governance structure in large public companies, which is based on 
the separation of corporate control2  and ownership 3  and derived from an independent and 
objective manager-overseeing responsibility of the board of directors, is deemed as a good model 
of corporate governance for foreign countries and companies to follow.  It is also deemed a 
better way to develop a sound corporate governance system and to maximize shareholders’ 
wealth. 
                                                 
1 See Stijn Claessens, Corporate Governance and Development, Global Corporate Governance Forum, 2003, 
available at 
http://www.gcgf.org/library/Discussion_Papers_and_Focus%20Notes/Focus_1_Corp_Governance_and_Developme
nt.pdf. 
2 See Am. L. Inst., Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 1.27. “Corporation 
control” refers to the active executive management of the corporation. 
3 Id. “Corporation’s ownership” refers to its shareholders.  
2 
However, the recent high-profile corporate and accounting scandals that have erupted in the U.S., 
such as Enron, WorldCom, and other companies, have shaken investors’ confidences in the U.S. 
securities markets.  These breaches of trust, failures of responsibility, breakdowns in governance, 
and lack of candid disclosure of directors, officers and corporations seriously undermine the 
corporate governance structure in the U.S.  They also imperil the basic structure of corporate 
capitalism, which is that investors entrust their assets to management while boards of directors 
oversee management so that the potential for conflict of interest between owners and managers is 
minimized. 4   Since these scandals, there is  a renewed attention and reflection to amend the 
corporate governance regulatory scheme in the U.S. 
 
Facing such financial frauds and trying to restore investors’ confidence led Congress to rapidly 
pass the renowned Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“S-O Act”) 5, which was promptly signed by the 
President.6  The S-O Act is one of the most significant federal corporate and securities legislation 
concerning the U.S. corporate governance structure in recent  years.  One of the main goals of the 
S-O Act is to improve investors’ confidence in the financial integrity of the public companies in 
the U.S., which in turn will promote confidence in the markets for these companies’ securities.  
In response to the directive provided by the S-O Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) has undertaken rulemaking in a number of areas.  Furthermore, the SEC has requested 
that the self- regulatory organizations  (“SRO”) revise and tighten their listing requirements.  
Hence, the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (“NYSE”) and the National Association of Securities 
Dealers, Inc (“NASD”) through its subsidiary, the Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. ("Nasdaq") filed 
                                                 
4 See Peter Jarrett, the United States Corporate Governance: the Market as Monitor, the OECD Observer, No. 203 
(1997), available  at http://www1.oecd.org/publications/observer/203/037-039a.pdf.     
5 The Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), Pub. 
L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat (2002). 
6 S-O Act was passed by Congress on July 25, 2002, and signed by the President the following weeks. 
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with the SEC to amend their listing rules to meet the new requirements of the S-O Act and the  
SEC rules to decrease the potential for future financial failures. 
 
However, some requirements of the new legislation have already been implemented by public 
companies before the enactment of new legislation. 7   For example, most large public 
corporations now already had a majority of independent directors on the board and had audit 
committees composed primarily of independent directors. 8   Enron and WorldCom are no 
exception.  In fact, Enron seems to have a model board in that respect, since only two of its 
fourteen directors are insiders.9  Nevertheless, it is still hypothesized under new legislation that 
the independence of the board is the best means to minimize the risk of future financial 
misstatements and accounting frauds.  Thus, the independence and oversight function of board of 
directors is emphasized. 
    
This major regulatory transition of the U.S. corporate governance regulations has already made a 
great impact on U.S. public companies, which have complained about the increasing costs of 
complying with the new corporate governance regulations 10  and the greater difficulties in 
                                                 
7 See e.g. Statement of the New York Stock Exchange on Audit Committee Policy (Jan. 6, 1977).  NYSE added a 
requirement, approved by the SEC, that as of June 30, 1978 each domestic company listed on the NYSE must 
establish and maintain "an audit committee comprised solely of directors independent of management and free from 
any relationship that, in the opinion of the board of directors, would interfere with its exercise of independent 
judgment as a committee member." 
8 See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm 
Performance, 54 Bus. Law. 921, 922 (1999)  
9 A number of studies show that firms with a majority of independent directors do not perform any better than firms 
without such boards, and the firms with only one or two inside directors may actually perform worse.  See Bhagat & 
Black, supra note 8, at 923; James P. Walsh & James K. Seward, On the Efficiency of Internal and External 
Corporate Control Mechanism, 15 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 421, 434 (1990)  
10 See Deborah Solomon and Cassell Bryan-Low, Companies Complain about Cost of Corporate-Governance Rules, 
Wall St. J. February 10, 2004, at A1. A survey of 321 companies shows that businesses with more than $5 billion in 
revenue expect to spend an average of $4.7 million each implementing Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 this year, according to Financial Executives International, which represents top corporate officers.  Much of 
the money is being spent on consultants, lawyers, auditors, and new software.   
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locating qualified outside directors due to the increased responsibilities and potential liability of 
directors, more stringent definitions of “independence” and “financial expert”, as well as greater 
time commitment demanded for directors.11   It also catches significant attention from foreign 
countries.  Since the U.S. is one of the biggest capital markets in the world, not only has its 
corporate governance system been partly followed by many countries and securities exchanges, 
but there are also many foreign companies listed on the U.S. national securities exchanges.  In 
this manner, although corporate governance structure is based on different legal systems and 
historical contexts from country to country, 12  recent amendments of the U.S. corporate 
governance regulations still have a very significant impact on foreign countries. 
   
Moreover, with globalization, internationalization of securities and finance markets, and the 
stronger influence of institutional investors nowadays, cross-border investment has been 
increasing and is more common.  Most countries relying on foreign investments and finance 
would orient their  corporate governance system to the international main stream, which now is 
the U.S. shareholder-centered corporate governance system and to amend their corporate 
governance legal frameworks.  By accommodating the U.S. corporate governance system, it is 
more favorable  for foreign companies to raise capital by cross issuing securities or cross listing 
on U.S. and their home countries’ securities markets.  And by entering into the U.S. securities 
market, it will also increase the reliability and confidence of both institutional and individual 
investors.   We can find this fact in Taiwan’s latest revision of corporate law in 2001.  The 
                                                 
11 See Kemba J. Dunham, Reforms Turn Search for Directors Into a Long, Tedious Task, Wall St. J. August 29, 
2002, at B1 (one CEO says a director search that used to take 3 to 8 months now may take 12 to 18 months). 
12 There is a two-tier board structure, which includes board of directors and supervisory board found in some 
countries, especially when their legal system is transplanted from European continent. 
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revision is to some extent an accommodation of the U.S. corporate governance system into their 
legal system. 
   
In the following sections, Part II first talks about the background of corporate governance.  Part 
III indicates the main topic of this thesis, the latest amendment of corporate governance 
regulatory scheme in the United States, mainly the S-O Act, SEC Rules and the NYSE and 
Nasdaq listing rules.  Part IV presents the latest transition of corporate governance in Taiwan.   
Part V discusses how the latest development of the regulatory scheme of corporate governance in 
the United States might impact foreign private issuers listed on the NYSE and Nasdaq.  Finally, 
Part VI is the conclusion of the thesis. 
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Chapter II  
Corporate Governance 
The term “corporate governance” first appears to have arisen and entered into prominent usage in 
the mid-to- late 1970s in the U.S. in the wake of the Watergate scandal, the discovery that major 
American corporations had engaged in secret political contributions at home and corrupt 
payments abroad.13  There are a wide variety of definitions for the term “corporate governance”.  
Simply put, “corporate governance” is a framework set by law and regulations of jurisdictions, 
by stock exchanges, and by companies’ interior charters and by- laws.  This framework is a 
process, not a state, which would continue evolving in its shape and contents over time 
throughout social and economic developments.  Since “corporate governance” is a framework set 
by laws and regulations of different jurisdictions, it is naturally different from country to country, 
and owes much to different history and cultural backgrounds of the region.  Despite its rather 
fashionable use in the modern times, a detailed and unified definition of the globally accepted 
term “corporate governance” does not exist. 
 
There are also different definitions of “corporate governance” in different domains. Economists 
and social scientists have a broader definition of “corporate governance” as "the institutions that 
influence how business corporations allocate resources and returns"14 and "the organizations and 
rules that affect expectations about the exercise of control of resources in firms."15  
Legal academics, however, tend to develop a narrower definition of corporate governance.  
                                                 
13 See E. Norman Veasey, The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a New Legal Discipline, 48 Bus. L. 1267 
(1993). 
14 See Mary O'Sullivan, Corporate Governance and Globalization, 570 Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 153, 154 (2000). 
15 World Bank, World Bank Development Report : Building Institutions for Markets (2002), at 68, available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/wdr/2001/fulltext/fm.pdf 
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Corporate governance is defined as a system of rules that determines the control and direction of 
the corporation and the power allocation among shareholders, directors and officers in order to 
maximize the shareholder values and stakeholders rewards as well.  This definition has been 
central to public policy discussions about corporate governance in the U.S. and some 
international organizations. 
 
In sum, “corporate governance” refers to structures and processes by which companies are 
directed and managed and the accountability of directors and management is thus stressed.  It is 
also meant to solve the principle-agent problems in the case of a company, that is, how the 
owners (shareholders) as principles can make sure in the lowest cost that their agents (managers) 
will act in their best interests. 
 
In the U.S., corporate governance issues have been a topic of discussion for the past 40 years.  In 
particular, some U.S. organizations like the Business Roundtable, the Conference Board’s 
Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprises, and pension funds like California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System have adopted their own corporate governance standards or 
principles to provide companies a model of corporate governance and to assess the potential 
investment opportunities.  Such entities and some international organizations like Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) and the World Bank have also 
suggested corporate governance reforms and set up principles and best practices of corporate 
governance.  These entities are calling for changes in corporate board compositions and 
8 
structures, especially focusing on the function of independent directors with more effective 
oversight over management.16 
 
Even though theses principles and recommendations presented by such institutions are not 
legally binding, they still provide a significant reference for national legislation and regulation, 
as well as guidance for stock exchanges, investor groups, corporations and other parties to 
achieve a good corporate governance structure.  In fact, the recent corporate governance reforms 
of the U.S., such as the S-O Act, SEC rules and SROs listing rules have embodied some of the 
requirements set out in these principles and recommendations.  
                                                 
16 See CalPERs, Corporate Governance Core Principles & Guidelines (1998), available at http://www.calpers-
governance.org/principles/domestic/us/page01.asp. 
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Chapter III 
Corporate Governance in the United States 
 
A. Regulatory Scheme 
1. State Corporation Law 
In the U.S., which has a federal legal system, each state has its own corporation code. Though 
each state code might have a high degree of similarity, they are not identical.  Hence, U.S. 
corporations are governed and regulated mainly by state corporation law with federal law in a 
supporting role.17  Only if the financing of the corporation is in connection with public offering 
of securities, must the corporation comply with both federal and state laws.18 
 
Generally, state corporation law is the principal law for corporations, setting regulations from the 
establishment to the dissolution of a corporation, including interior structures and functions of a 
corporation, the relationship between shareholders, board of directors, and officers, and their 
rights, authorities, responsibilities, and duties.  In addition, judicial decisions by different state 
courts have also developed some important legal doctrines governing corporate activates, such as 
"the business judgment rule" and the “fiduciary duty” of corporate officers and directors to the 
corporations. 
 
                                                 
17 Rocert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law, and Federal Regulation, 
38, wake, Forest L, Rev. 961, 961, (2003). 
18 Charles R.T. O’Kelly & Robert B. Thompson, Corporations and Other Business Associations, 175 (4th ed. 2003).  
10 
Pursuant to the corporation code of Delaware19 and the Model Business Corporation Act, all 
corporate power is exercised by or under the direction of the board of directors, 20  and 
shareholders do only three things: vote, sell, or sue.21  Theoretically, shareholders can exercise 
ultimate control over the board and the management through directors’ elections and removals.  
They also can resolve major issues of corporations initiated by the board.  While in reality, as 
shareholders have to act through collective action, individual shareholders, and especially 
minority shareholders have often been unable to exert their shareholders rights effectively.22 
 
Given the complexities of a corporation’s day-to-day activities and the inefficiency of directors 
overseeing daily operations of business, officers, as agents of the corporations, exercise the most 
important corporate powers.  Nevertheless, in legal theory they are clearly subordinate to the 
board of directors and are barely mentioned in most corporate statutes.23  Hence, in practice, the 
boards’ primary function has turned to be selection, engagement and replacement of officers, 
namely monitoring management’s action. 
 
As stated, U.S. corporations basically are governed by state laws.  Regarding the debates of 
whether corporate governance should be a federal or state function, federal government until 
now did not choose to pass a federal corporate statute that would have federalized the 
                                                 
19 Delaware is the home state of about 60 percent of the Fortune 500 companies in the U.S. 
20 See, eg., Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, §  141(a)(1999) (all corporate power to be exercised by or under the direction of 
the board of directors). 
21 See Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting Shareholder Rights to 
Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 215, 216 (2000). 
22 With the increasing concentration of the institutional investors ’ holdings, however, stockholders may be gaining a 
renewed influence.  
23 The corporation statutes defer almost completely to a corporation’s bylaws or board resolutions as to what officers 
might do, how they are chosen, and how vacancies are filled, except for minimal default provisions.  
11 
corporation laws.24  However, with the enactment of the S-O Act and accompanying SEC rules, 
some might think we are now in a federalism crisis 25 and fear significant federal intrusion into 
the state law area.26  Most of the reason for the fear is because the S-O Act is not like other 
federal securities laws which mainly address the mandatory disclosure requirements.  The S-O 
Act also addresses the interior structures and function mechanisms of companies, such as audit 
committees, interior and disclosure controls, and prohibited acts of directors and officers, which 
are usually the core of the governance system regulated by state laws. 
 
However, there may be some explanation for some states’ inactiveness in facing such dramatic 
regulatory changes both in federal regulations and SROs rules of corporate governance since 
2002.  One explanation may be that the  recent corporate scandals are so specific to the unique 
characteristics that there is no need to change the state law dramatically.27  Besides, though the 
S-O Act, the SEC rules, and even the SROs’ listing standards may largely influence the U.S. 
corporate governance structures and bring huge challenges to state laws, they are not dominant 
and eventually not a replacement of state laws either.  State corporation laws will still govern the 
basic structure of corporate governance and continue to evolve. 
 
2. Federal Regulation 
Since the 1930s, federal laws concerning corporate governance are in the supporting status while 
state laws are in the leading role as stated before.  Unlike state laws, federal laws focus mainly 
                                                 
24 Supra note 18, at 197. 
25 See William B. Chandler, III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance 
System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. (2003). 
26 See E. Norman Veasey, Corporate Governance and Ethics in the Post-Enron Worldcom Environment, 38 Wake 
Forest L. Rev. 839, 848. (2003). 
27 See Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law, and Federal 
Regulation, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 961, 966, (2003). 
12 
on the functioning of capital markets, addressing disclosure obligations upon public companies 
whose securities are offered, sold, or traded in the U.S. securities market.  From the late 1970s, 
the SEC began to set normative standards for corporate governance through its disclosure 
requirements.  It requires disclosures regarding whether issuers have standing audit, nominating 
or compensation committees.  Besides, companies subject to the proxy rule of Section 14 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are required to disclose in the proxy statement when directors 
are to be elected, (i) if the company has an audit committee, (ii) the names of each audit 
committee member, (iii) the number of audit committee meetings held, and (iv) the functions 
performed by the committee.  With major federal regulatory changes since 2002, however, 
federal laws now provide more corporate governance structure norms than ever.  Some even say 
that federal law now occupies the largest part of the legal corporate governance infrastructure in 
the twenty-first century. 28 
 
In short, though there is no fundamental change in the legal principles applicable to the duties 
and responsibilities of board of directors and officers in the S-O Act,29  it specifies new and 
broader responsibilities of officers, particularly the chief executive officer (“CEO”) and the chief 
financial officer (“CFO”) of public companies.  For example, these officers must certify financial 
statements, which are also checked by the company’s internal and disclosure control system to 
ensure an accurate result. 30   Besides the emphasis on officers, the S-O Act also includes 
provisions specifying the structures and compositions of audit committees and the qualification 
                                                 
28 See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon 
Federalism, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 859, 861-62 (2003).  
29 The S-O Act does not change the business judgment rule or other fundamental tenets of corporation law 
applicable to boards of directors and officers.  For example, directors can continue to rely on statutory exculpation 
from personal liability for breaches of the duty of care if it is provided in the charter pursuant to Section 102(b)(7) of 
the Delaware Corporation Code and other similar statutes in other states.     
30 See supra note 5, §401(a)(i).  This followed SEC action pursuant to its investigatory powers that required top 
officers of almost 1000 companies to certify their financial results.  
13 
and role of independent directors.  Moreover, like past federal regula tions used a mandatory 
disclosure system as a traditional mechanism to regulate corporate governance, the S-O Act also 
takes it as a significant method of regulation. 
 
3. SROs Rule 
There were stock exchanges before enactment of state corporation codes and federal securities 
laws.31  Though corporate governance of listed companies was not the central part of securities 
exchanges’ function in their early era, which was to attract and protect investors, it is required 
that listed companies issue financial statements and earning report periodically in the first place. 
 
In 1998, the NYSE and the NASD sponsored a committee to study the effectiveness of audit 
committees.  This committee became known as the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the 
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees ("Blue Ribbon Committee").  In its 1999 report, 
the Blue Ribbon Committee recognized the importance of audit committees and issued ten 
recommendations to enhance their effectiveness.32  In response to these recommendations, the 
NYSE and the NASD as well as other exchanges revised their listing standards, requiring listed 
firms to have audit committees composed mostly or exclusively of independent directors.33 
 
In February 2002 in light of several high-profile corporate failures, the SEC's Chairman at that 
time requested that the NYSE and the NASD, as well as other exchanges, review their listing 
                                                 
31 The NYSE traces its origins to 1792.  See Stuart Banner, Anglo-American Securities Regulation, Cultural and 
Political Roots, 1690-1860, 250-51 (1998). 
32 See Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate 
Audit Committees (February 1999). The Blue Ribbon Committee Report is available at www.nyse.com.  
33 See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 42233 (December 14, 1999), 64 FR 71529 (December 21, 1999) 
(NYSE); 42231 (December 14, 1999), 64 FR 71523 (December 21, 1999) (NASD); 42232 (December 14, 1999), 64 
FR 71518 (December 21, 1999) (American Stock Exchange); and 43941 (February 7, 2001), 66 FR 10545 (February 
15, 2001) (Pacific Exchange). 
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standards with an emphasis on all listing standards concerning corporate governance.34  After 
reviewing their listing standards about corporate governance, the NYSE and the NASD, through 
Nasdaq, filed corporate governance reform proposals and amendments with the SEC.35   For 
example, the NYSE amended Section 303(A) of the NYSE’s Listed Company Manual to 
implement significant changes of corporate gove rnance (NYSE Corporate Governance Proposal).  
The Nasdaq amended NASD Rule 4200 and 4350(c) and (d) to modify requirements relating to 
board independence and independent committees (Nasdaq Independent Director Proposal).  It 
also amended NASD Rule 4350(b) to add a requirement for issuers to announce publicly any 
audit opinions with going concern qualifications (Nasdaq Going Concern Proposal), NASD Rule 
4350(h) to require an issuer’s audit committee or another independent body of the board of 
directors to approve related party transactions (Nasdaq Related Party Transactions Proposal), 
NASD Rule 4350(a) to require foreign issuers to disclose any exemptions they may receive from 
Nasdaq’s corporate governance listing standards (Nasdaq Issuer Applicability Proposal), and 
NASD Rule 4350(n) to require listed companies to adopt a code of conduct for all directors, 
officers, and employees (Nasdaq Code of Conduct Proposal).  On November 4, 2003, the SEC 
approved the NYSE and Nasdaq proposals as well as amendments listed above.36 
 
In reality, the NYSE and Nasdaq corporate governance rules are as important, if not more 
important, as any provisions in the S-O Act and the SEC rules.  These new adopted listing rules 
have made listed companies review and modify their interior corporate governance structures. 
  
                                                 
34 See SEC Press Release No. 2002-23.  
35 See SEC Release File Nos. SR-NYSE-2002-33, SR-NASD-2002-77, SR-NASD-2002-80, SR-NASD-2002-138, 
SR-NASD-2002-139, SR-NASD-2002-141. 
36 See SEC Release No. 34-48745.  
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B. Summary of New Corporate Governance Requirement 
The S-O Act and accompanying corporate governance rules adopted by the SEC, the NYSE, and 
the Nasdaq have generally imposed new wide-range requirements of corporate governance in the 
U.S., requiring public companies (or listed companies) to step back and analyze their entire 
corporate governance structure to meet the newly enacted regulatory requirements. 
        
The following subchapter is not a complete summary of the new legislation but an overview of 
some major and influential requirements.  It is important to note that the S-O Act applies to 
public companies whose securities are registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, companies required to file reports under Section 15(d) of that Act, or companies 
that file or have filed registration statements that have not yet become effective under the 
Securities Act of 1933, which have not yet been withdrawn.37  Whereas, if a public company is 
also a NYSE or Nasdaq listed company, it also has to observe NYSE or Nasdaq standards.   
 
1. Independent Directors 
To strengthen the oversight function of the board, to have a majority of independent directors on 
the board,38 to tighten and narrow the definition of independent directors,39 and to require the 
board to affirmatively determine that directors are independent 40 are the emphases and the most 
focal points of the new legislation. 
                                                 
37 See Supra note 5, § 2(7). 
38 See NYSE rule Section 303A(1); NASD Rule 4350(c)(1). 
39 See NYSE rule Section 303A(2)(b); NASD Rule 4200(a)(15).  
40 See NYSE rule Section 303A(2)(a); NASD Rule 4350(c)(1). 
16 
However, the S-O Act does not specifically address the role and authority of independent 
directors except in the context of the audit committee.  There are also different definitions and 
criteria to “independent directors” in the new legislation. 
 
a. Independence of Majority of Board Members 
In the new legislation, the NYSE and the Nasdaq rules require each listed company to have a 
majority of independent directors on its board, though the S-O Act doesn’t affirmatively require 
each public company to have a majority of independent directors on its board.41  
 
b. Definition of Independence 
Under Section 301(3)(B) of the S-O Act, every audit committee member must be “independent”.  
The criteria of “independence” of directors under the S-O Act prohibit directors from accepting a 
consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the company other than director and 
committee fees and from being affiliated persons of the company or its subsidiaries. 
 
But for listed companies of national securities exchanges, SEC Rule 10A-3 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Rule 10A-3”) provides that it is prohibited for independent directors to 
“directly or indirectly” accept a compensatory fee from the company.  Unless the securities 
exchanges rules provide otherwise, however, compensatory fees do not include the receipt of 
fixed amounts of compensation under a retirement plan (including deferred compensation) for 
prior service with the listed company (provided that such compensation is not contingent in any 
way on continued service).  Nevertheless, Rule 10A-3 also provides that it would not preclude 
                                                 
41 See NYSE rule Section 303A(1); NASD Rule 4350(c)(1). 
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independence on the basis of ordinary course commercial business relationships between the 
company and an entity with which a director had a relationship. 
 
As for NYSE and Nasdaq rules, they emphasize both corporate self-governance and disclosure 
with respect to the independence of directors.  The boards should first affirmatively determine 
that the independent director has no material relationship with the company (either directly or as 
a partner, shareholder or officer of an organization that has a relationship with the company) and 
then disclose the basis for such determination of independence in its annual proxy statement or in 
the annual report on Form 10-K filed with SEC. 
 
In order to provide clarity to investors and listed companies and to facilitate uniform application 
of the rules, NYSE rule Section 303A(2)(b) and NASD Rule 4200(a)(15) respectively set up a 
bright line test to determine “independence” of the directors, such as the relationship of 
employment, receiving in excess of amount of compensation or payment from the company.  
However, to be more flexibly applied, some suggest that it should be designed as a rebut table  
presumption, rather than a bright line rule.42 
  
Since the concern of “independence” is to be separated from management, the S-O Act, NYSE, 
and Nasdaq rules do not disqualify independent directors from stock ownership of even a 
significant amount of stock.43  However, none of them explicitly recognize or encourage stock 
ownership by independent directors.  Nevertheless various non-government entities have called 
                                                 
42 See Letter from Charles M. Nathan, Committee on Securities Regulation of the Association of the Bar of the City 
of New York, to Secretary, the SEC, dated April 25, 2003. 
43 See commentary to NYSE rule Section 303A(2)(a) and NASD Rule 4200 Interpretive Materials  
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for further governance reforms of the recognition of the importance of stock ownership of 
independent directors as an incentive to exercise their objectivity. 44 
 
c. Separate Meetings of Non-management Directors 
In order to improve the independence and objectivity of the board, NYSE and Nasdaq rules 
require the non-management directors to meet at regularly scheduled executive sessions without 
management.45  However, this may create some problems.  First, without critical information 
available to management, decisions made by the non-management directors may not be informed 
decisions and could be harmful to the company or not in its best interests, thus raising liability 
issues. 46   Besides, what is the difference and relationship between non-management director 
meetings and the meetings of audit and other committees?  Once non-management directors 
make a resolution or recommendation and submit it to the boards, is there any restriction to the 
boards to accept the resolution made by the non-management directors?  
 
2. Audit Committee 
Even though some empirical studies have shown that the presence of an audit committee does 
not effectively affect and prevent the likelihood of accounting fraud,47 one of the most significant 
aspects of the S-O Act is requirement of an audit committee comprised of only independent 
directors and the expansion of the functions and responsibilities of the audit committee.  
However, it is not mandatory under the S-O Act to require each public company to establish an 
                                                 
44 See Charles M. Elson and Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and Corporate Governance Reform, 38 Wake 
Forest L. Rev. 855, 881, (2003). 
45 See Commentary to NYSE rule Section 303A(3); NASD Rule 4350(c)(2). 
46 See Letter from Charlotte M. Bahin, Senior Vic President, Regulatory Affairs, America’s Community Bankers, to 
Jonathan G. Katz. Secretary, Commission, dated May 8, 2003.  
47 See Mark S. Beasley, An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of Director Composition and 
Financial Statement Fruad, 71 Acct. Rev. 443 (October 1996).   
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audit committee of the board.  Under Section 2(a)(3) of the S-O Act, if no audit committee exists 
in the company, the entire board would be deemed as the audit committee.   
 
However, with respect to listed companies, it is mandatory to set up an audit committee of the 
board.  Section 301 of the S-O Act explicitly provides that the SEC should direct the national 
securities exchanges and national securities associations to prohibit the listing of any security of 
an issuer that does not have an audit committee composed solely of independent directors.  In 
words, securities exchanges would de-list companies, which do not satisfy the S-O Act’s audit 
committee requirements. 
  
Under the new legislation, the audit committee would be given new responsibilities and duties, 
including actively involvement in the accounting decision-making and processes, appointment 
and oversight of the outside auditors, and approval of both audit and non-audit services provided 
by outside auditors.  At the same time, the committee would be given additional resources, like 
funding from companies to access outside counsels.  The following discusses the composition, 
qualification, responsibilities and duties of an audit committee and its members under the new 
legislation. 
 
a. Composition 
i. Minimum number of members 
Pursuant to NYSE rule Section 303A(6) and (7) and NASD Rule 4350(d), each listed company 
must have a minimum three-person audit committee, composed entirely of independent directors.   
ii. Audit Committee Charter 
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NYSE rule Section 303A(7)(c) and NASD Rule 4350(d) also require that each audit committee 
have a written audit committee charter that addresses the committee’s purpose and an annual 
performance evaluation of the audit committee.  The duties and responsibilities of the audit 
committee at minimum must include those set out in Rule 10A-3(b)(2), (3), (4), and (5), and 
other requirements set forth in NYSE or Nasdaq rules.48 
iii. Separate Meetings 
In order to help perform oversight functions of the audit committee more effectively, NYSE rule 
Section 303A(7)(c)(iii)(E) requires the audit committee to meet separately and periodically with 
management, with internal auditors and with independent auditors.    
 
b. Qualification of Membership 
i. Independent Director 
Under Section 301 of the S-O Act and Rule 10A-3(b)(1)(i), all members of audit committees 
must be independent directors.  In addition, NYSE rule Section 303A(7)(b) and NASD Rule 
4350(d)(2) also require listed companies to have an audit committee with members that satisfy 
the requirements of independence stipulated in Rule 10A-3 and their own listing standards. 
    
ii. Financial Literacy and Financial Expert 
NYSE rule Section 303A(7)(a) and NASD Rule 4350(d)(2) require that each member of the 
audit committees of listed companies must be financial literate, as interpreted by the company’s 
board in its business judgment, or must become financial literate within a reasonable period of 
time after his or her appointment to the audit committee.  NASD Rule 4350(d)(2) further 
provides that “financial literate” includes being “able to read and understand fundamental 
                                                 
48 See NYSE rule Section 303A(7)(c); NASD Rule 4350(d).  
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financial statements, including a company’s balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow 
statement.” 
 
With respect to a financial expert, neither the S-O Act nor the SEC rules compulsorily require 
members of audit committees to be financial experts.  However, Section 407 of the S-O Act 
requires companies to disclose in their annual reports, whether, or if not the reasons therefore, 
the audit committee is comprised of at least one member, who is a financial expert as defined in 
the S-O Act and the SEC rules.49  The SEC rules further require the companies to disclose the 
name of the audit committee financial expert and affirm that the expert is independent of 
management, as determined by the company’s board of directors, or provide why the expert is 
not independent.50  
 
While under NYSE and Nasdaq rules, it is mandatory to have at least one financial expert on the 
audit committee.  Under commentary to NYSE rule Section 303A(7)(a), a financial expert has 
accounting or related financial management expertise, as the board interprets such qualification 
in its business judgment.  Under NASD Rule 4350(d)(2)(a), a financial expert has past 
employment experience in finance or accounting, the requisite professional certification in 
accounting, or any other comparable experience or background which results in the individual’s 
financial sophistication, including being or having been a CEO, CFO, or other senior officer with 
financial oversight respons ibilities.  
 
                                                 
49 See Supra note 5, §407, to qualify as a financial expert “the Commission shall consider whether a person has, 
through education and experience as a public accountant or auditor or a principal financial officer, comptroller, or 
principal accounting officer of an issuer” sufficient experience.  See also SEC Release Nos. 33-8177; 34-47235.  
50 See SEC Release NOS. 33-8177; 34-47235. 
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iii. Dedication  
Recognizing that time and effort commitment would be necessary for an effective audit 
committee member’s satisfaction of the demanding role and responsibilities, the commentary to 
NYSE rule Section 303A(7) requires that each prospective audit committee member should 
evaluate carefully the existing demands on his or her time before accepting the job.  Besides, if 
an audit committee member simultaneously serves on the audit committee of more than three 
public companies and the listed company doesn’t limit the number of audit committees on which 
its audit committee member serves, then each board would be required to determine that such 
simultaneous  service would not impair the ability of the member to serve effectively on the listed 
company’s audit committee.  Such determination must be disclosed in the company’s annual 
proxy statement or in the company’s annual report filed with the SEC, if the company does not 
file annual proxy statement.       
 
c. Responsibility 
i. Oversight of Outside Auditors  
Under Section 301 of the S-O Act and Rule 10A-3(b)(2), the audit committee is directly in 
charge of the appointment, compensation, retention and oversight of the work of outside auditors, 
including resolution of disagreements between management and the auditor regarding financial 
reporting.  To carry out the responsibility of monitoring outside auditors, Section 204 of the S-O 
Act and Rule10A-3(b)(2) provide that outside auditors shall timely report directly to the audit 
committee about all critical accounting policies and practices to be used, all alternative 
treatments of financial information within generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) 
that the auditor has discussed with the management officers of the company, the ramifications 
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and the auditor’s preferred alternative, and any other material written communication between 
the auditors and management officers of the company. 
 
And to ensure the independence and objectivity of the outside auditors, Section 201(a) and 
Section 202 of the S-O Act also provide that the audit committee must pre-approve both audit 
and permissible non-audit services provided by the outside auditors in advance.  In practicing, 
the SEC suggests that audit committees may establish policies and procedures for pre-approval 
provided they are consistent with the S-O Act, detailed as to the particular service, and designed 
to safeguard the continued independence of the outside auditors.51  It is important to notice that 
some non-audit services are now specifically prohibited under Section 201(a) of the S-O Act.52  
But for other permitted non-audit service, like tax services, unless they are qualified under the 
De-minimus exceptions provided in Section 202, the services must be pre-approved by the audit 
committee and be disclosed to the shareholders in periodic reports.  Besides, disclosure is 
required by the SEC rules to investors of information related to audit and non-audit services 
provided by, and fees paid to, the auditor in the companies’ proxy statement or annua l reports.53 
 
In addition to the responsibilities and duties of audit committees with respect to the outside 
auditors stated above, NYSE rule Section 303A(7)(c)(iii) also requires audit committees to 
discuss the annual and quarterly financial statements with the outside auditors, periodically meet 
                                                 
51 See SEC Release NO. 33-8183; 34-47265; 35-27642; IC-25915; IA-2103, FR-68. 
52 The S-O Act creates the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to oversee the auditing of public 
companies.  Each public accounting firm must register with the PCABO, and according to the S-O Act Section 
201(a), registered public accounting firms will be prohibited from performing certain services to clients, including: 
bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting records or financial statements of the audit client; financial 
information systems design and implementation; appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-
in-kind report; actuarial services; internal audit outsourcing services; management functions or human resources; 
broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services; and legal services and expert services 
unrelated to the audit.   
53 Supra note 51. 
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separately with them, and review with them any audit problems or difficulties and management’s 
response, to make the audit committees better understand the financial situation of the company,.  
 
ii. Establishment of Internal Procedure for Oversight  
Under the new legislation, the audit committee has a duty to establish internal procedures to 
oversee the corporation’s financial compliance situation.  According to Section 301 of the S-O 
Act and Rule 10A-3(b)(3), the audit committee must establish procedures for two purposes, one 
of which is for receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints received by the company regarding 
accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters, and the other is for the confidential, 
anonymous submission by employees of the company of concerns regarding questionable 
accounting or auditing matters. 
 
iii. Other Responsibilities  
In addition to the responsibilities of an audit committee stated above, under NYSE rule Section 
303A(7)(c)(iii), the audit committee’s responsibilities also include discussing the company’s 
earnings press releases, as well as financial information and earnings guidance to analysts and 
rating agencies, discussing policies with respect to risk assessment and risk management, and 
reporting regularly to the board of directors. 
 
d. Engagement of Outside Counsels  
In order to enhance the efficient oversight function of the audit committee, the audit committee 
has the authority under Section 301 of the S-O Act to engage independent counsels and other 
advisors as it determines necessary to carry out its duties.  Such costs to hire counsels or advisors 
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will be funded by the company.  In this way, the audit committee may obtain adequate and 
correct information to make informed decisions without entirely relying on the unilateral 
information provided by officers or inside directors of the company.  On the other hand, 
independent directors are able to rely on the advice of outside advisors in order to exercise their 
business judgment in a manner that they reasonably believe to be in the best interests of the 
company and the shareholders.  Thus, the right to retain outside advisors by the audit committee 
can also help establish a reasonable basis for reliance of members of audit committees as well as 
help members carry out their duties.      
 
3. Nominating/Corporate Governance Committee 
The S-O Act does not require public companies to establish or address the role or composition of 
any other committees of the board other than audit committees.  However, NYSE rule Section 
303A(4) requires that companies must have a nominating/corporate governance committee 
composed entirely of independent directors.  It also requires such committee to have a written 
charter that addresses the committee’s purpose and responsibilities and an annual performance 
evaluation of the nominating/corporate governance committee. 
   
NYSE rule Section 303A(4) further provides that the nominating/corporate governance 
committee would be required to identify individuals qualified to become board members, 
consistent with the criteria approved by the board, and to select or to recommend that the board 
select the director nominees for the next annual meeting of shareholders.  However, if the right to 
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nominate a director legally belongs to a third party by contract or otherwise, the nominating 
committee’s selection and recommendation are not required.54 
  
Under NASD Rule 4350(c)(4), it is not mandatory for Nasdaq listed companies to set up a 
nominations committee of the board.  However, if set up, the nominations committee must be 
comprised solely of independent  directors.  The rule  requires that the director nominees either be 
selected or recommended for the board’s selection either by the majority of independent  
directors or by a nomination committee comprised solely of independent directors under NASD 
Rule 4350 (c).       
 
4. Compensation Committee 
In addition to the mandatory requirement of the establishment of nominating/corporate 
governance committees in listed companies, NYSE rule Section 303A(4) also requires that 
companies must have compensation committees composed entirely of independent directors 
directly in charge determining compensation of the CEO, making recommendations to the board 
with respect to non-CEO compensation, incentive-compensation plans and equity-based plans, 
and reviewing as well as approving corporate goals and objectives.  Like the 
nominating/corporate governance committee, it also requires the compensation committee to 
have a written charter that addresses the committee’s purpose and responsibilities and an annual 
performance evaluation of the compensation committee.55  Besides, the compensation committee 
                                                 
54 See commentary to NYSE rule Section 303A(4). 
55 See NYSE 303A(5)(b). 
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would also be required to produce a compensation committee report on executive compensation 
and disclose it in the company’s annual proxy statement or annual report filed with the SEC.56 
    
However, the compensation committee does not have the sole authority to determine the 
compensation of a CEO under the NYSE rule.  Either as a compensation committee or together 
with other independent  directors (as directed by the boards), the committee would determine and 
approve the CEO’s compensation level based on the committee’s evaluation of the CEO’s 
performance.57  Besides, the compensation committee may retain an outside consulting firm to 
assist in the evaluation of director, CEO or senior executive compensation.  Whereas the 
compensation committee should have sole authority to retain, approve of fees and other retention 
terms, and terminate the consulting firm.58 
  
Unlike the NYSE rule, the NASD Rule 4350(c)(3) does not compulsorily require a compensation 
committee of the boards.  However, if set up, the compensation committee must be comprised 
solely of independent directors.  And as for the decision of compensation of the CEO, it requires 
that companies have CEO compensation determined by either a compensation committee or by a 
majority of independent directors. 
 
5. Responsibilities of Executives Officers and Directors 
a. CEO and CFO Certifications 
The new legislation focuses heavily on the responsibility of officers, especially the CEO and 
CFO to take full responsibility for their companies’ compliance with disclosure requirements and 
                                                 
56 See NYSE rule Section 303A(5)(b). 
57 See NYSE rule Section 303A(5)(b)(i)(A). 
58 See commentary to NYSE rule Section 303A(5). 
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the truth and integrity of financial statements.  The requirement  of CEO/CFO certification may 
enhance companies to engage in better due diligence about their financial statements.  The 
certification requirements of CEO and CFO under the S-O Act and the NYSE rule are as follows. 
i. S-O Act Certification     
There are two separate CEO/CFO certification requirements under the S-O Act, which are 
Section 906 and Section 302.  To distinguish certification under Section 906 and Section 302, 
first, it is important to address that certification under Section 906 would be deemed to be 
“furnished” rather than “filed” to the SEC, while certification under Section 302 would be 
deemed to be “filed” to the SEC.59   This distinction matters mainly because it would direct 
whether the certification would be subject to civil liability under Section 18 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 as a misleading statement, or it would be automatically incorporated by 
reference into an issuer’s registration statements, which is subject to civil liability under Section 
11 of the Securities Act of 1933. 
  
The certification under Section 906 requires that the CEO and CFO certify, as to each periodic 
report containing financial statements, such as annual and quarterly reports that the reports fully 
comply with securities regulations and the information contained fairly presents in all material 
respects, the financial conditions and results of operations of the company.  Failure to furnish the 
Section 906 certification would make the periodic reports incomplete in violation of Section 13(a) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Besides, false certifications may also result in 
significant criminal penalties. 
 
                                                 
59 SEC Release Nos. 33-8124, 34-46427, IC-25722. 
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The certification under Section 302 is more extensive than the certification under Section 906.  
Following this Section 302 certification requirement, the SEC adopted Rule 13a-14 and Rule 
15d-14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, developing the term "disclosure controls and 
procedures"60 to make it explicit that the “internal controls” 61 contemplated by Section 302(a)(4) 
of the S-O Act are intended to embody controls and procedures addressing the quality and 
timeliness of disclosure.  The SEC also included this definition to differentiate the concept of 
“disclosure controls and procedures” from the pre-existing concept of "internal controls" that 
pertains to an issuer's financial reporting and control of its assets, as currently embodied in 
Section 13(b) of the Exchange Act and as addressed in Sections 302(a)(5) and (a)(6) and Section 
404 of the S-O Act. 
 
With respect to the establishment and maintenance of internal controls under Section 302(a)(4) 
and (5) of the S-O Act, the CEO and the CFO must certify that they have designed the internal 
controls to ensure that material information is made known to them, have evaluated the 
effectiveness of the internal controls as of a date within 90 days prior to the report, and have 
presented in the periodic report their conclusions about the effectiveness of the internal controls.  
They also have to certify that they have disclosed to the auditors and audit committees all 
                                                 
60 “Disclosure controls and procedures” is a newly-defined term under newly adopted Rule 13a-14 and Rule 15d-14 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, reflecting the concept of controls and procedures related to disclosure 
embodied in Section 302(a)(4) of the S-O Act.  For the purpose of the new rules, “disclosure controls and 
procedures” is  defined as controls and other procedures of an issuer that are designed to ensure that information 
required to be disclosed by the issuer in the reports filed or submitted by it under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 is recorded, processed, summarized and reported, within the time periods specified in the SEC's rules and 
forms.  "Disclosure controls and procedures" include, without limitation, controls and procedures designed to ensure 
that information required to be disclosed by an issuer in its Exchange Act reports is accumulated and communicated 
to the issuer's management, including its CEO and CFO, as appropriate to allow timely decisions regarding required 
disclosure.  
61 “Internal controls” is a pre-existing term relating to internal controls regarding financial reporting.  See American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") Codification of Statements on Auditing Standards, AU §319. 
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significant deficiencies and material weakness in internal controls and any fraud whether or not 
material that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the internal 
controls, and have indicated in the periodic reports whether or not there were significant changes 
in internal controls, including any corrective action with regard to significant deficiencies and 
material weaknesses. 
 
Besides, under Section 302(a)(1), (2), and (3), each CEO and CFO must certify in each annual or 
quarterly report filed or submitted to the SEC that they have reviewed the report, that to their  
knowledge the report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact, and that the 
financial information in the report fairly presents in all materials respect the financial conditions 
and results of operations of the company. 
  
False certifications under Section 302 not only might give rise to liability under Section 11 and 
Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, if the periodic report is incorporated by reference 
into a registration statement on Form S-3 or Form F-3 or into a prospectus filed pursuant to Rule 
424(b), false certifications  might also be subject to SEC action for violation of Section 13(a) or 
(15)(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and both the SEC and private action for violating 
Section10(b) and Rule10(b)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  According to the S-O 
Act, false certifications might also result in significant criminal penalties. 
 
ii. NYSE Certification and Notification 
According to NYSE rule Section 303A(12)(a), each listed company CEO must certify to the 
NYSE annually that he or she is not aware of any violation by the company of NYSE corporate 
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governance listing standards.  This certification would be required to be disclosed in the listed 
company’s annual report to the shareholders or filed with the SEC.  In addition, NYSE rule 
Section 303A(12)(b) also requires that the CEO promptly notify the NYSE in writing after any 
executive officer of the listed company becomes aware of any material non-compliance with any 
applicable provisions of this Section 303A.    
 
The effect of the CEO and the CFO certifications under the S-O Act and the NYSE rules is that 
the due diligence burden would be shared by key executives who report to the certifying officers 
and, in large companies, to even lower levels of executives.  In fact, the SEC strongly 
recommended that, corporations each create a committee with responsibility for considering the 
materiality of information and determining disclosure obligations on a timely basis.  Such a 
committee would report to senior management, including the CEO and the CFO, who bear 
express responsibility for designing, establishing, maintaining, reviewing and evaluating the 
issuer's disclosure controls and procedures.62  Officers and employees of corporations who have 
an interest in, and the expertise to serve on, the committee could include the principal accounting 
officer (or the controller), the general counsel or other senior lega l official with responsibility for 
disclosure matters who reports to the general counsel, the principal risk management officer, the 
chief investor relations officer (or an officer with equivalent responsibilities) and such other 
officers or employees, including individuals associated with the corporation’s business units, as 
the corporation deems appropriate.  The setup and operation of this committee might increase the 
effectiveness of internal controls. 
 
b. Forfeiture of CEO/CFO Bonuses and Profits 
                                                 
62 See SEC Release NOS. 33-8124, 34-46427, IC-25722. 
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Under Section 304(a) of the S-O Act, if the company is required to restate its financial 
statements due to material noncompliance with the securities laws as a result of misconduct, the 
CEO and the CFO must reimburse the company for any bonus or incentive or equity-based 
compensation received during the 12 months following the first public issuance or the filing with 
the SEC of the flawed report, as well as any profits on sales of company securities during that 
period.  However, the SEC may exempt any person from application of the section as it deems  
necessary and appropriate under Section 304(b) of the S-O Act. 
 
Though it provides for the forfeiture of CEO and the CFO bonuses and profits, there is no 
requirement under the S-O Act that the misconduct in question be that of the CEO or the CFO.  
Hence, on the one hand, this provision may reinforce the oversight responsibilities of the CEO 
and the CFO to the subordinate officers in the company.  On the other hand, this provision seems 
too burdensome for the CEO and the CFO given the near impossibility of monitoring the conduct 
of each employee to ensure the truthfulness and completeness of the financial statement despite 
the applicable exemptions by the SEC.   
 
c. Loan Prohibition 
One of the important provisions in the S-O Act about directors and officers is the prohibition of 
corporate loans to directors and officers.  It is a provision that was for many years part of state 
corporate law, but which has been entirely deleted by the Model Business Corporation Act in the 
1988 revision.  But the S-O Act has now brought it back.63 
 
                                                 
63 See supra note 5, §402; 1 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 47, at 950-53 (2d ed. 1971) (describing the 1969 Model 
Act and earlier state law); 2 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann., §8.60, at 8-396 (3d ed. Supp. 2002) (describing thirty –four 
jurisdictions that continue to prohibit loans to directors and/or officers or allow them in limited circumstances). 
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According to Section 402 of the S-O Act, companies are prohibited from directly or indirectly, 
including through any subsidiary, extend ing or maintaining credit, arranging for the extension of 
credit, or renewing the extension of credit, in the form of a personal loan to or for any director or 
executive officer (or equivalent thereof) of the corporation.  This requirement essentially 
eliminates all personal loans to directors and officers.  Numerous questions arise accompanying 
the application to this provision, since this prohibition of personal loans might include various 
transactions which are now going on, such as the cashless exercise of stock options, split dollar 
life insurance, advances of director and officer indemnification expenses pursuant to charter, 
bylaw or contractual provisions, travel advances, personal use of company credit cards, 
relocation payments, deferred compensation, leveraged co- investments, loans from 401(k) plans, 
and forgiveness of grandfathered loans.64 
 
However, under Section 402(a) of the S-O Act, there are some exceptions to such prohibition of 
personal loans.  For example, Section 402(a) does not exclude any home improvement and 
manufactured home loans, consumer credit under an open end credit plan, or a charge card or 
any extension of credit by a broker or dealer registered under Section 15 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 to an employee of that broker to buy, trade, or carry securities that is 
permitted under the rules or regulations of the Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System 
pursuant to Section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that is: (i) made or provided in the 
ordinary course of the consumer credit business of such issuer; (ii) of a type that is generally 
made available by such issuer to the public; (iii) made by such issuer by market terms, or terms 
                                                 
64 Robert C. Schwenkel, The Post-Enron Corporate Governance Environment: Where Are We Now, 1377 PLI/ Corp 
11, 116 (2003).   
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that are no more favorable than those offered by the issuer to the general public for such 
extension of credit. 
 
d. Temporarily Freeze Authority 
Section 1103 of the S-O Act gives the SEC the authority to petition a federal district court for a 
temporary order to freeze payments (whether compensation or otherwise) to directors, officers, 
partners, controlling persons, agents or employees of a company that appear to be 
“extraordinary” if there is an ongoing lawful investigation involving possible violation of the 
federal securities laws by the company or those persons.  The temporary order will require the 
company to escrow, subject to court supervision, those payments in an interest-bearing account 
for 45 days. 
 
6. Financial Disclosure 
a. Financial Reports 
Section 401(a) of the S-O Act requires each financial report, which contains financial statements 
and that is required to be prepared in accordance with (or reconciled to) GAAP and filed with the 
SEC reflect all material correcting adjustments identified by outside independent auditors. 
  
b. Off-Balance Sheet Transactions 
Section 401(a) of the S-O Act requires companies to disclose in their annual and quarterly 
reports all material off-balance sheet transactions, arrangements, obligations (including 
contingent obligations), and other relationships of the companies with unconsolidated entities or 
other persons that may have a material current or future effect on the financial condition, changes 
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in the financial condition, results of operations, liquidity, capital expenditures, capital resources, 
or significant components of revenue or expenses. 
 
And the SEC, pursuant to Section 401, adopted amendments to the rules 65  with respect to 
disclosure of off-balance sheet arrangements in a separately cautioned subsection of the 
Management’s Discussion and Analysis (“MD&A”) section of SEC filings.66  In sum, companies 
must include in the MD&A a discussion of off-balance sheet arrangements67 that have or are 
reasonably likely to have a current or future effect on the registrant’s financial condition, 
changes in financial condition, revenues or expenses, results of operations, liquidity, capital 
expenditures or capital resources that are material to investors. 
 
In addition, the SEC rule also requires disclosure of contractual obligations in tabular format in 
the MD&A to disclose (i) long-term obligations, (ii) capital leased obligations, (iii) operating 
                                                 
65 The SEC adopted amendments to Item 303 of Regulation S-K, Item 303 of Regulation S-B, Item 5 of Form 20-F 
and General Instruction B of Form 40-F under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  
 
66 See SEC Release Nos. 33-8182; 34-47264; FR-67 International Series Release No. 1266 File No. S7-42-02. 
67 The definition of "off-balance sheet arrangement" primarily targets the means through which companies typically 
structure off-balance sheet transactions or otherwise incur risks of loss that are not fully transparent to investors. For 
example, in many cases, in order to facilitate a transfer of assets or otherwise finance the activities of an 
unconsolidated entity, a company must provide financial support designed to reduce risks to the entity or other third 
parties. That financial support may assume many different forms, such as financial guarantees, subordinated retained 
interests, keepwell agreements, derivative instruments or other contingent arrangements that expose the registrant to 
continuing risks or material contingent liabilities. To appropriately capture these transactions, the definition of "off-
balance sheet arrangement" includes any contractual arrangement to which an unconsolidated entity is a party, under 
which the registrant has: (i) any obligation under certain guarantee contracts; (ii) a  retained or contingent interest in 
assets transferred to an unconsolidated entity or similar arrangement that serves as credit, liquidity or market risk 
support to that entity for such assets; (iii) any obligation under certain derivative instruments; and (iv) any obligation 
under a material variable interest held by the registrant in an unconsolidated entity that provides financing, liquidity, 
market risk or credit risk support to the registrant, or engages in leasing, hedging or research and development 
services with the registrant. See SEC Rule Release Nos. 33-8182; 34-47264; FR-67; International Series Release No. 
1266.  
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lease obligations, (iv) purchase obligations, and (v) other long-term debt liabilities reflected on 
the company’s balance sheet under GAAP.  Such table of contractual obligations must be 
included in registration statements, annual reports, and proxy or information statements that are 
required to include financial statements. 
 
c. Pro Forma Financial Information 
Section 401(b) of the S-O Act requires that pro forma financial information included in the 
reports filed with the SEC or in any public disclosure or press or other release be presented so as 
not to contain an untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the pro forma financial information not misleading.  In addition, pro form 
financial information must be reconciled with the financial condition and results of operations of 
the company under GAAP. 
 
d. Non-GAAP Financial Measure Disclosure 
Pursuant to Section 401 (b) of the S-O Act, the SEC adopted new disclosure regulation 
“Regulation G,” amendments to Item 10 of Regulation S-K and Item 10 of Regulation S-B, and 
Forms 8-K and 20-F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to regulate the use of “non-GAAP 
financial measures,” “adjusted” data, or earnings before “non-recurring charges.”68 
 
Regulation G requires the company to disclose together with any non-GAAP financial measure, 
(i) a presentation of the most directly comparable financial measure calculated and presented in 
accordance with GAAP and (ii) a reconciliation (by schedule or other clearly understandable 
method), which must be quantitative for historic non-GAAP measures and quantitative, to the 
                                                 
68 See SEC Release No. 33-8176; 34-47226; FR-65; FILE NO. S7-43-02. 
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extent available without unreasonable efforts for the forward-looking information, of the 
difference between the non-GAAP financial measure disclosed or released with the most directly 
comparable financial measure or measures calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP.  
If the reconciliation to the most directly comparable financial measure calculated and presented 
according to GAAP is not available for the forward- looking non-GAAP financial measure, the 
company must disclose that fact, explain why it is not available on a forward- looking basis, and 
provide any reconciling information that is available without an unreasonable effort.  The 
company must identify any information that is unavailable and disclose its probable significance. 
 
Regulation G also provides that a non-GAAP financial measure, taken together with the 
accompanying information, may not contain an untrue statement of a material fact or omit to 
state a material fact necessary to make the presentation of the non-GAAP financial measure not 
misleading, in light of the circumstances under which it is presented. 
 
In addition, the SEC adopted amendments to Item 10 of Regulation S-K and Item 10 of 
Regulation S-B to provide additional guidance to those registrants that include non-GAAP 
financial measures in the ir SEC filings.  The SEC also adopted amendments to Form 20-F to 
incorporate into that form the amendments to Item 10 of Regulation S-K.  It adopted 
amendments to Form 8-K that require registrants to furnish earnings releases or similar 
announcements to the SEC. 
 
7. Insider Trading 
a. Accelerated Disclosure of Insider Trades 
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Section 403(a) of the S-O Act amended Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
providing that insider69 trades, including any change in the ownership of securities or purchase or 
sale of a security-based swap agreement involving such equity security must be filed with the 
SEC and Securities Exchanges (if it is a listed company) within two business days.  Such 
statements filed with the SEC must also be made electronically and disclosed on both the SEC 
website and the company website by the end of business day following the disclosure filing. 
  
Pursuant to Section 403(a) of the S-O Act, the SEC adopted amendments to Rules 16a-3, 16a-6, 
and 16a-8, and Forms 3, 4 and 5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to implement the 
accelerated filing deadline applicable to the change of beneficial ownership reports required to 
be filed by insiders under the new legislation. 
 
b. Prohibition of Insider Trading During Blackout Period 
Section 306 of the S-O Act and new Regulation BTU (Blackout Trading Restriction) under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 adopted by the SEC70, ban any director or executive officer 
from directly or indirectly purchasing or selling or otherwise acquir ing or transferring any equity 
security during a “blackout period” that temporarily prevents plan participants or beneficiaries 
from engaging in equity securities transactions through their plan accounts with respect to such 
security, if such director or officer acquire such equity security in connection with his or her 
service or employment as a director or executive officer. 
 
                                                 
69 Insiders refer to directors, officers, and shareholders who are directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more  
than 10 percent of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security), which is registered pursuant to 
Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
70 See SEC Release NO. 34-47225; IC-25909; File No. S7-44-02. 
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The trading prohibition only applies during a “blackout period,” which is defined for U.S. 
companies as any period exceeding three consecutive business days during which transactions in 
equity securities of such companies are temporarily suspended.  Under Regulation BTU, the 
prohibition on insider trading during blackout periods would not apply to a blackout period that 
affects a plan maintained outside the U.S. primarily for the benefit of persons located outside the 
U.S., as such plans are not considered “individual account plans.”  In addition, Regulation BTU 
does not apply to employee benefit plans that have been approved by a foreign taxing authority 
or are eligible for preferential treatment under foreign tax laws. 
           
8. Internal Control Report 
Section 404 of the S-O  Act requires the SEC to adopt rules requiring each annual report to 
contain an internal control report, which states the responsibility of management for establishing 
and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting and 
contains an assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures for 
financial reporting.  Accordingly to the SEC revised rules,71 each annual report must include a 
report from management on the company’s internal control over financial reporting.  The internal 
control report must contain (i) a statement of management’s responsibilities for establishing and 
maintaining adequate internal controls over financial reporting for the company, (ii) 
management’s assessment of the effectiveness of these internal controls over financial reporting 
as of the end of the most recent fiscal year, (iii) a statement identifying the framework used by 
management to evaluate the effectiveness of the company’s internal control, and (iv) a statement 
that the company’s outside auditors who issued the audit report have attested to, and reported on, 
management’s internal controls evaluation.  Such attestation report by the outside auditors 
                                                 
71 See SEC Release Nos. 33-8238; 34-47986; IC-26068 
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should be filed as part of the annual report. Furthermore, it is required that management evaluate 
any change in the company's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during a 
fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the 
company's internal control over financial reporting. 
  
9. Corporate Governance Guideline 
Under NYSE rule Section 303A(9), each listed company must adopt and disclose corporate 
governance guidelines.  Each listed company’s website would be required to include its 
corporate governance guidelines and the charters of its most important committees.  Each 
company’s annual report on Form 10-K filed with the SEC would be required to state that the 
foregoing information is available on its website. 
The following topics would be required to be addressed in corporate governance guidelines: 
director qualification standards; director responsibilities; director access to management and, as 
necessary and appropriate, independent advisors; director compensation; director orientation and 
continuing education; management succession; and an annual performance evaluation of the 
board. 
  
10. Code of Ethics and Compliance 
Section 406 of the S-O Act requires companies to disclose in their periodic reports whether they 
have adopted a written code of ethics applicable to their senior financial officers, their CFO and 
comptroller or principal accounting officer, or people performing similar functions (and if not, 
state the reason).   
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In addition to requiring the disclosure mandated in Section 406, the SEC amended the rules to 
require disclosure as to whether the company has a code of ethics that applies to its CEO.72  
Under the SEC rules amendments, a company has to disclose whether it has adopted a code of 
ethics that applies to the company's CEO, CFO, principal accounting officer or controller, or 
persons performing similar functions in its annual report.  A company disclosing that it has not 
adopted such a code must disclose this fact and explain why it has not done so.  The SEC rules 
specifically indicate that companies may have separate codes of ethics for different types of 
officers, directors, and employees.   
 
The code of ethics must include standards reasonably designed to deter wrongdoing and 
necessary to promote: (i) honest and ethical conduct, including the handling of actual or apparent  
conflicts of interest between personal and professional relationships, (ii) full, fair, accurate, 
timely and understandable disclosure in reports and documents that the company files with, or 
submits to, the SEC and in other public communications made by the company, (iii) compliance 
with applicable governmental laws, rules, and regulations.  (iv) prompt internal reporting of code 
violation to “an appropriate person or persons ” identified in the code, and (v) accountability of 
adherence to the code. 
 
Under the SEC rules, companies can choose between three alternative methods of making their 
ethics codes publicly available.  First, a company may file a copy of its code of ethics as an 
exhibit to its annual report.  Alternatively, it may post the text of its code of ethics, or relevant 
portion thereof, on its Internet website, provided however, that a company choosing this option 
also must disclose its Internet address and intention to provide disclosure in its annual report.  As 
                                                 
72 See SEC Release NOS. 33-8177; 34-47235. 
42 
another alternative, it may provide an undertaking in its annual report on one of these forms to 
provide a copy of its code of ethics to any person without charge upon request. 
  
In addition, the company is required to make “immediate disclosure” on Form 8-K or via Internet 
dissemination (only if it previously disclosed its website address and its intention in its most 
recently filed annual report) of any change to, or waiver from, the company's code of ethics for 
its senior financial officers within five business days  after it amends its ethics code or grants a 
waiver. 
  
In addition, this code of ethics can form part of a broader code of ethics that complies with the 
NYSE rule of “code of business conduct and ethics” and the Nasdaq rule of “code of conduct.”  
NYSE rule Section 303A(10) requires each listed company to adopt and disclose a code of 
business conduct and ethics for directors, officers and employees and promptly disclose any 
waivers of the code for directors or executive officers.  It is important to notice that the waivers 
of the code for executive officers or directors could only be made by the board or a board 
committee. 73   The code of business conduct and ethics would need to be available on the 
company’s website and the availability of the code on the website would be required to be 
referenced in the company’s annual report filed with the SEC.   
 
NASD Rule 4350(n)  requires each listed company to adopt a code of conduct applicable to all 
directors, officers, and employees.  The code of conduct must be publicly available and comply 
with the definition of “code of ethics” set forth in Section 406(c) of the S-O Act and the SEC 
                                                 
73 See Commentary to NYSE rule Section 303A(10) 
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rule.  Any waiver of the code for directors or executive officers must be approved by the board 
and disclosed in a Form 8-K within five days.            
 
11. Approval of Related Party Transactions 
To protect the interests of shareholders, NASD Rule 4350(h) requires that each Nasdaq listed 
company conduct an appropriate review of all related party transactions 74 for potential conflict of 
interest situations on an ongoing basis.  All such transactions would have to be approved by the 
listed company’s audit committee or another independent body of the board. 
   
12. Shareholder Approval of Equity Compensation Plan 
NASD Rule 4350(i) requires shareholder approval of most equity compensation plans, which 
now currently do not require shareholder approval.  It requires shareholder approval when a 
stock option or purchase plan is to be established or materially amended or other arrangement 
made pursuant to which options or stock may be acquired by officers, directors, employees or 
consultants, other than warrants or rights issued generally to all security holders of the company 
or stock purchase plans available on equal terms to all security holders as well as shareholder 
approval for tax qualified, non-discriminatory employee benefits plans or parallel nonqualified 
plans and plans or arrangements relating to an acquisition or merger, or inducement grant.  It is 
important to notice that parallel nonqualified plans and inducement grants still have to be 
approved either by the compensation committee or by a majority of the company’s independent 
directors.  Though this requirement of approval of compensation plan by shareholders could 
                                                 
74 For the purpose of this rule, “related party transaction” would refer to transactions required to be disclosed 
pursuant to the SEC Regulation S-K, Item 404. 
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prevent detriment to shareholders, it would result in an increase in companies’ proxy solicitation 
costs. 
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Chapter IV 
    The Convergence and the Transition of Corporate Governance Structure 
 in Taiwan 
A. Convergence of Corporate Governance Systems 
As stated, there is not just one globally suitable corporate governance model.  Adversely, every 
jurisdiction would develop its own structure based on its country’s cultural, social, economic, 
and legal environment.   Corporate governance systems of the U.S. and some other countries 
with Anglo-American legal systems, namely common law systems, are built on the foundation of 
a stock market-centered capital market, focusing shareholders’ rights and based on dispersed 
ownership.  This dispersion of ownership mitigates direct shareholder involvement in corporate 
governance and leads to the separation of ownership and management.  Corporate governance 
systems of Germany and some other countries with Continental European legal systems, namely 
civil law systems, rest on a bank-centered capital market, focusing stakeholders’ rights and based 
on concentrated ownership.75 
 
There is a “global convergence of corporate governance” theory, simply put, that globalization 
will create competition between companies governed by various corporate governance regimes.76  
Globalization will create competition between the dispersed-ownership model and the 
concentrated-ownership model in the corporate governance domain.  The dispersed-ownership 
model, at the end, will emerge victorious because of the reduction of capital costs.  Large 
                                                 
75 See Ronald J. Gilson, Globalization Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 Am. J. Comp. 
L. 329, 329 (2001); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate 
Governance and its Implication, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 641, 642-43(1999).  
76 Coffee, supra note 75, at 642. 
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corporations always need more capital to grow and compete in their product markets, and strong 
securities markets give these companies more efficient access to capital and support innovations 
through direct financing.77 
 
Of course there is no exception for global convergence theory of corporate governance as a 
theory facing contrary views.  Some criticize that the dispersed-ownership model is not the most 
efficient model of corporate governance.  They point out some shortcomings, such as the model 
encouraging management to place too much emphasis on short-term gains.78  In addition, the 
monitoring function of management and gaining information about the company is not superior 
to the concentrated-ownership model.79 
 
The most important fact is that “one size does not fit all.”  Legal systems, business cultures, and 
corporate structures are just too different to have a universal code of best practice applying to 
every company.  And directly adopting legal structures from abroad is to some extent dangerous 
because of potential compatibility risks.80 
 
The OECD reflects this view in the preamble to its “Principles of Corporate Governance”, where 
it states, “There is no single model of good corporate governance.”81  And the Global Corporate 
                                                 
77 See Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S. Black, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus 
Stock Markets, 47 J. Fin. Econ. 47, 47 (1998). 
78 See Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. Pol. Econ. 61, 62 (1988) (discussing the 
theory of managerial myopia, which argues that the takeover market puts pressure on management and leads them to 
focus more on short-term profits).  
79 See Coffee, Supra note 75, at 661 (discussing the argument that blockholders are superior monitors); see also 
Jeremy Edwards & Klaus Fischer, Banks, Finance, and Investment in Germany (1994). 
80 See Lutz-Christian Wolff & Bing Ling, the Risk of Mixed Laws: The Example of Indirect Agency Under Chinese 
Contract Law, 15 Col. J. Asian L 173, 174-75 (2002). 
81 See “OECD Principles of Corporate Governance”, Preamble, p. 2. (available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/governance/principles.html  ). 
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Governance Forum, formed by the World Bank and OECD, has been debating whether it should 
promote developed country governance standards or allow emerging markets to “be scored 
against guidelines crafted by them and shaped for their conditions, rather than against standards 
they had no role in writing.” 
 
As a result, nevertheless, we cannot ignore the power of globalization and the growth of 
international capital markets towards the shareholder-oriented model.  It is also important to 
recognize the differences between countries with dispersed and concentrated ownership 
structures. 
      
B. Some Major Differences between the Dispersed and Concentrated Ownership Model   
Though it is hard to simply sum up every corporate governance system in different jurisdictions 
under a “common law system” or “civil law system,” there are still some intrinsic characteristics 
and differences between these two legal systems. 
 
1. Board Structure     
Firstly, corporation structures in civil law countries are different from the structures set out in 
common law countries.  Generally, there is a statutory two-tier board structure in civil law 
countries.  A “Management Board” is solely responsible for the management of the corporation 
and a “Supervisory Board” supervises the activities of the Management Board.  The Supervisory 
Board is a separate monitoring body apart from the Management Board, with members also 
being elected in the shareholder meeting.  In some countries like Germany, a Supervisory Board 
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even takes charge of appointment of members of the Management Board.82  Since a Supervisory 
Board’s task is not to manage, but to monitor the management and operations by the 
Management Board and officers, members of the Supervisory Board usually can not 
concurrently serve on the Management Board, nor serve as officers or employees of the 
corporation. 
 
In contrast, common law countries use a monistic system in which the board of directors serves 
both a management and oversight function.  However, for large public companies, the board’s 
oversight function is addressed more than its management function, mainly because of the 
practical impossibility for such directors to exercise day-to-day operation of the company.  To 
serve the oversight function, it is necessary to have an independent and objective board.  Hence, 
the corporation would set up several committees, such as audit, nominating/corporate 
governance, or compensation committees comprised entirely of independent directors to fulfill 
these responsibilities. 
 
2. Shareholder Structure 
Shareholder structure might be the most fundamental difference in corporate governance 
structure between civil law and common law countries.  Most capital obtained by companies in 
civil law countries traditionally is not from direct securities markets, but from intermediary 
financial institutes.  It achieves the existence of controlling shareholder structure, no matter it is 
dominated by family groups or banks.  While companies in common law countries are more like 
                                                 
82 See Lutz-Christian Wolff, Law as a Marketing Gimmick-the Case of the German Corporate Governance Code 3 
Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 115, 117 (2004). 
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the shareholder-oriented structure, relying on capital from securities market.  This brings about 
the dispersed ownership structure and mitigates direct shareholder involvement. 
 
The concentrated ownership structure in civil law countries suggests that minority shareholders 
will hardly be able to out-vote controlling shareholders who have a sufficient majority of the 
votes, and the ownership and management of such companies would not be separate either.  
Besides, the concentrated ownership structure would probably lead to undisclosed related-party 
transactions, self-dealing, and insider trading, which are all seriously detrimental to the interests 
of minority shareholders. 
 
3. Relationship between Shareholders and Board   
The other important difference between civil law and common law systems is that civil law 
countries have mandatory corporate governance statutes with a clearly defined division of power 
between shareholders and directors.  The corporate laws of these countries enumerate exclusive 
rights of the shareholder meeting, which cannot be delegated to or appropriated by the board.  
Powers not included in this list are assumed to be within the realm of the board’s power.  
Shareholders in the common law countries have much more extensive rights to opt out of the 
statutory legal rules. 
 
C. Reasons for Convergence  
With the needs for more efficient access to foreign capital markets and protection of the interests 
of shareholders, there is a strong demand for changes in corporate governance systems around 
the world.  And, naturally, a corporate governance structure in the U.S., which has strong 
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securities markets, has become the object of emulation.  Moreover, U.S. institutional investors 
hold more than 50% of all listed corporate stocks (about 60% in the largest 1,000 corporations).  
The largest 25 pension funds accounted for 42% of the foreign equity held by all U.S. 
investors.83  Thus, U.S. institutional investors have further urged foreign countries without sound 
and transparent corporate governance systems to make significant changes in their formal 
governance institutions to more closely resemble the U.S. corporate governance system, since 
the quality of the corporate governance system of a country is a significant determinant for 
capital market development.84 
 
In addition, with more and more non-U.S. corporations listing their securities on U.S. securities 
exchanges to directly raise foreign investment, such foreign private issuers not only voluntarily 
comply with the listing agreement with the securities exchange, they are also obliged to register 
under Section 12(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  This registration subjects them to a 
host of U.S. securities regulations, though there is some exemptive relief for foreign private 
issuer. 
 
It is also worth addressing that companies with access to strong securities markets will have a 
significant competitive advantage over companies that do not.  Thus, countries would like to 
enable their companies to take advantage of the global securities markets by providing them a 
legal regime that could adequately protect the interests of shareholders and meet the latest trends 
of corporate governance reforms. 
                                                 
83 See James McRitchie , Enhancing the Return on Capital Through Increased Accountability (2003), available at 
http://www.corpgov.net. 
84 CalPERS has announced a set of general principles-its six General Principles including director accountability to 
shareholders’ rights.  
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D. Transition of Legal Regulatory scheme of Corporate Governance in Taiwan 
1. Overview 
It is very late for Taiwan to assume modern notions of corporate governance in comparison to 
other Asian countries.  For example, Singapore in 1989 had required audit committees.  In 1998, 
Japan launched its first code of best practice of the Corporate Governance, and Korea had 
adopted new listing rules about corporate governance by the Korea Stock Exchange. 85   This 
reluctance to assume modern notion may be because Taiwan suffered much less during the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997 or because of the Taiwanese government’s strongly interventional 
economic policies. 
   
Generally, a Taiwanese company raises capital through both direct financ ing in capital markets 
and indirect financ ing, such as bank loans.  But capital markets have become an increasingly 
important source for obtaining capital lately.86  Between 1999 and January 2004, the number of 
companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange increased from 462 to 670, and the market 
capitalization increased from NTD 11,803,524 millions (around USD 347,162 millions) to NTD 
13,910,346 million (around USD 409,128 millions). 87   These figures not only show that the 
reliance on the capital market to raise funds for Taiwanese companies is stronger than ever, it 
also shows the need for the transformation of the corporate governance system to meet the latest 
corporate governance developments. 
 
                                                 
85 See Jamie Allen, Code Convergence in Asia: Smoke or Fire, CGI, 23, 32-35 (2000), available at available at 
http://www.gcgf.org/library/speeches/AllenAsiaCnvrg.doc 
86 See Rafael La Port et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. Fin. 471, 491-500 (1999). 
87 See Statistics of Securities Market, TSE, available at http://www.tse.com.tw/docs/statistics/statisticalF.htm. 
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The Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”), which is Taiwan’s securities regulator has 
emphasized the importance of good corporate governance structure to public companies and  
added more disclosure requirements in SFC rules.  But it was not until November 2001 when 
Taiwan’s congress passed the amendment of corporate law, when formally established a legal 
foundation for a corporate governance system in Taiwan.  Based on the revision of corporate law, 
the SFC adopted several rules about corporate governance, such as rules adding more disclosure 
requirements in public companies’ periodic reports and real time disclosure, as well as rules 
setting up the qualification of independent directors and their duties for listed companies.  In 
addition, Taiwan Stock Exchange (“TSE”) and Taiwan’s computerized over-the-counter market, 
also known as GreTai Securities Market, (“GTSM”), adopted best practices of corporate 
governance for listed companies.  In addition to listed companies, there are also some similar 
best practice principles of corporate governance adopted by SROs in Taiwan regulating some 
financial institutes, such as securities firms, futures commission merchants, securities investment 
trust enterprises, and securities investment consulting enterprises. 
 
2. Corporate Governance Structure in Taiwan 
This section includes a brief introduction of securities markets and some issues of corporate 
governance structure in Taiwan. 
 
a. Composition of Investors in Taiwan Securities Market 
Before introducing the corporate governance structure in Taiwan, it is important to note that the 
securities markets in Taiwan are not like those in the U.S. or other countries where large 
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institutional investors play important roles, by forming a strong lobby for reform. 88  Conversely, 
according to the statistics made by TSE in December 2003, only 5.09% of trading volume is 
contributed by the foreign institutional investors, 12.75% is from domestic institutional investors, 
while 81.55% of trading volume is contributed by the domestic individual investors.89 
 
With the largest percentage of trading in Taiwan’s securities market contributed by individual 
investors, Taiwan’s securities market is a shallow plate market.  It is easily affected by market 
sentiments and fluctuation, resulting in a high turnover rate of trading.  Individual investors 
usually lack professional knowledge and have less extensive access to information than 
institutional investors.  Plus, they are usually minority shareholders of companies, and are more 
passive than institutional shareholders in actively overseeing the operation of companies.   
Consequently, the transition of corporate governance structure in Taiwan is not based on 
institutional investors’ advocacy and pressure as influential shareholders on companies, but on 
government ’s strategy making. 
 
b. Interior Corporate Structure 
The original corporate law in Taiwan is transplanted from Germany.   There is a mandatory 
requirement of a two-tier board structure, boards of directors and supervisors in Taiwan. 90  Under 
corporate law, Boards are in charge of management of corporations and operation of business, 
whereas supervisors are in charge of monitoring the execution of business operations of the 
                                                 
88 Supra note 18,195 (By 1998, institutional investors held about 60% of the shares in companies traded on the New 
York Securities Exchange).   
89 Securities Transaction categorized by the type of investors, TSE, available at http://www.tse.com.tw  
90 See Taiwan’s corporate law, Art . 192 (providing for the board of directors); Art. 216 (providing for the 
supervisors). 
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corporations.  They have the duty to audit the statements and records prepared fo r submission to 
the shareholders' meeting by the board of directors, and to make a report of their findings and 
opinions at the meeting of shareholders.91 
 
c. Family Group Concentrated Structure of Ownership 
Looking at the corporate governance structure in Taiwan, it is important to realize that most 
Taiwanese companies are small and medium-sized enterprises, and are usually dominated by 
family groups.  In fact, one of the prominent features of Asian business landscape is the 
predominance of family-run companies.  About two-thirds of listed companies and substantially 
all of private companies are family-owned.92 
 
This strong family control over companies usually encompasses overwhelming control over both 
boards and supervisors, including decision-making and operation of the business, oversight of 
management, and also the agendas of shareholder meetings. 93   Though there are some 
advantages of a family-controlled business, such as having a strong leadership and cohesive 
management team formed by the family members, there is no denying that there are some serious 
downsides that this absolute concentrated power might lead to potential abuses of power, 
sacrificing the interests of minority shareholders.  And one of the most serious drawbacks is the 
lack of effective oversight function to the board and management. 
   
In order to de-centralize this family-dominated, concentrated ownership structure, there is a 
mandatory requirement for public companies to disperse of securities in the Securities Exchange  
                                                 
91 Id. Art. 219, Paragraph 1. 
92 See OECD Asian Roundtable on corporate Governance , White Paper on Corporate Governance in Asia (2003).    
93 Supra note 86, at 502 (stating that family-controlled companies are very common). 
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Law and SFC rules in Taiwan.  However, in reality, it is still hard to break up the existing 
family-dominated type of ownership structure or to prevent these family groups from utilizing 
other nominal shareholders to conceal the holding of concentrated ownership structure. 
  
d. Cross Shareholding  
In addition to the family-controlled ownership structure, there is another issue of cross 
shareholding by parent and subsidiary companies in the corporate governance structure.  Before 
the revision of corporate law in 2001, there was no provision prohibiting cross-holding shares 
between parent companies and their subsidiaries.  Therefore, there was a loophole in the legal 
framework, allowing some subsidiary companies to be set up as investment companies with their  
main corporate purpose to buy a great deal of their parent companies’ shares from stock markets.  
There are two major purposes behind this purchase scenario: one is to manipulate the stock 
market by driving up their parent companies’ stock price and the other is to being elected as 
director or supervisor of the ir parent companies, allowing parent companies to gain more control 
power over boards and supervisors.  However, both of the purposes are detrimental to the 
interests of minority shareholders. 
 
Thus, the revision of corporate law expressly prohibits the cross shareholding between parent 
companies and their subsidiaries.  It provides that subordinate companies shall not redeem or buy 
back any controlling companies’ shares, nor accept any of them as collateral.  In this way, the 
revision of corporate law may bring an end to the existing cross shareholding structure between 
parent and subsidiary companies in Taiwan. 
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e. Legal Person Shareholder  
Under corporate law in Taiwan, it is permissible for a legal person (or government) shareholder 
“itself” to be elected as director or supervisor, or for the person to designate several 
representatives to run for election.  The legal person (or government) must appoint a natural 
person to act on its behalf, carrying out the director or supervisor’s duties.  If the legal person (or 
government ) designates several representatives to run for election of directors and supervisors, 
they can all be elected concurrently.  This difference creates a critical unfairness as the natural 
person cannot be elected for several posts of directors and supervisors at the same time.  
Moreover, no matter what model the legal person (or government) adopts, once the legal person 
(or government) or the appointed representatives have been elected, the legal person has the right 
to remove its appointed directors and supervisors and replace them with other appointees at will.  
In this way, if the legal person (or government) designates representatives to be elected as 
directors or supervisors, the “actual” director or supervisor would not be that natural person but 
the legal person (or government).  It is also hard to determine and distinguish the attribution of 
legal responsibilities of the legal person and its appointees. 
    
Moreover, though there is a prohibition under corporate law that supervisors cannot concurrently 
be directors, officers or employees of the corporation, there is no restriction prohibiting a legal 
person from appointing several representatives to be elected concurrently as directors and 
supervisors.  Theses appointees can be irrespectively elected as directors and supervisors even 
though they are from the same legal person (or government) shareholder, because they are 
deemed different “persons.” 
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Hence, with respect to the election of directors and supervisors in Taiwan, one of the serious 
downsides, which has not been solved yet by the revision of corporate law in 2001, is that there 
is no restriction for several representatives of the same legal person (or government) shareholder 
from being elected and serving concurrently as directors and supervisors.  Since supervisors in 
the corporate governance structure in Taiwan are responsible for the oversight of boards and 
management, several representatives beholden to one legal person would lead to an inadequate 
check-and-balance mechanism in the corporate governance. 
   
3. Transition of Corporate Governance Structure 
As stated, there was an overall revision of corporate law in 2001.  This has brought in a major 
transition from a concentrated-ownership model towards a U.S. shareholder-oriented and 
dispersed-ownership model in the corporate governance system in Taiwan.  corporate law in 
Taiwan establishes the fundamental regulatory basis for the corporate governance system and 
applies to every corporation whether public or private.  With respect to public companies, they 
must also adhere to Taiwan’s Securities Exchange Law, which focuses on the function of 
securities markets, like disclosure and transparency of corporation information and prevention of 
securities frauds.  Several important aspects included in the revision of corporate law in 2001 are 
discussed in the following subsections. 
 
a. The Independence of the Board of Directors and Supervisors  
The original corporate law requires that all directors and supervisors must be shareholders of the 
company.  This election requirement maintains existing major shareholders’ control over the 
company, and hinders the independence of the board of the company.  Since companies in 
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Taiwan are mostly owned by family groups, if independent directors and independent  
supervisors can only be elected from shareholders, it is hard to expect majority shareholders not 
to expropriate interests of minority shareholders. 
 
Thus, the revised corporate law allows non shareholders to be elected as directors or supervisors. 
Though this single revision of the revised article cannot show much of the advocacy of 
independence of boards, the importance behind this revision is that it supplies a legal basis for 
the SFC or other competent authorities to promulgate rules concerning independent directors and 
independent supervisors in public corporations. 
 
And after revision of the corporate law, the SFC soon adopted rules and releases to provide 
responsibilities and qualifications of independent directors and independent supervisors in public 
companies.  TSE and GTSM also amended their listing rules, requiring new listed companies to 
have at least two independent directors and one independent supervisor on the boards.  However, 
without a mandatory requirement of independent directors and independent supervisors by law 
levels, the SFC or other authorities cannot require every public company to set up and maintain 
independent directors and independent  supervisors on the board by rules. Hence, the SFC rules 
only suggest public companies voluntarily setting up independent directors and independent  
supervisors.  As for TSE and GTSM listing rules, firstly, they are only applied to companies 
which are new applicants of listing.  And there is no requirement for already listed companies to 
have independent directors and independent supervisors on the board.  Secondly, they don’t 
expressly require new applying companies to maintain independent directors or independent 
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supervisors after their securities are listed.  Hence, there is room for improvement to have a good 
effect of independence of board directors and supervisors. 
  
Moreover, without major shareholders’ support, like allocating their votes for the “independent” 
directors or “independent” supervisors candidates, it is almost impossible for a independent 
director candidate to be elected.  Accordingly, it is also hard to expect these directors or 
supervisors to exert their oversight duties to the best of their abilities and prevent major 
shareholders from eradicating the interests of minority shareholders, especially when they are 
actually nominated and elected by these major shareholders. 
 
However, there are some imperfections of the requirements of independence of boards and 
supervisors in new corporate governance regulations.  It might somehow serve to help undermine 
the current domination of controlling shareholders over the board and supervisors. 
              
b. The Duty of Loyalty 
One of the most notable recent changes of the corporate governance structure in corporate law 
was the addition of an express duty of loyalty of directors, supervisors, and officers.  Before 
revision, the corporate law and civil law had expressly imposed a duty of care on directors, 
supervisors, and officers, but there was no express duty of loyalty under corporate law.  Even 
though the duty of loyalty of directors has been developed by case law in Taiwan, it is still 
debated whether the duty of loyalty is nonetheless owed by directors and other fiduciaries.  Thus, 
the new express duty of loyalty of directors provided in corporate law is an important step 
towards increasing the responsibilities of directors and other fiduciaries.  But the ultimate 
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effectiveness of the duty of loyalty still largely depends on how Taiwan courts and scholars 
develop and interpret the specific nature and scope of the duty.    
 
c. The Role of Manager 
The basis of modern corporate governance structure, the separation of ownership and 
management, gives rise to powerful managers since corporations rely on professional managers 
more and more.  The greater role and increased responsibilities of managers provided in the 
revision of corporate law shows that it is placing greater importance on professional managers in 
corporations. 
 
First, the new provision provides a company with more flexibility to create whatever 
management position, structure, and hierarchy it may require, allowing companies to establish 
their own management systems in their charters.  Second, the new provision clarifies the 
authority of managers to administer the affairs of the company and sign documents on behalf of 
the company if provided in the charter of the company or by contract.  By expressly allowing 
managers to act as the legal representative of the company, the new law indicates the shift 
towards increased authority and power for managers.  And third, along with the greater power 
imposed on managers provided in the revised corporate law, it also comes with the duty of 
loyalty in the revised corporate law on managers to prevent abuses and misconduct. 
 
d. Convergence of Corporate Governance Structure   
The recent revisions of the corporate law indicate that Taiwan is making a gradual transition 
toward a shareholder-oriented model of corporate governance structure.  And the revisions of the 
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corporate law also show that Taiwan is now struggling with the family group ownership structure 
by bringing in independence of directors and supervisors, the duty of loyalty, and imposing 
increased power on managers. 
 
From the revision of Taiwan’s corporate law, we know that several points of the U.S. corporate 
governance system have been converged.  These include enhancing shareholder values and 
upholding shareholder rights by transforming the ownership structure of the company and by 
imposing more responsibilities on directors and supervisors; introducing independent directors 
and independent supervisors to provide an outside view in overseeing the operation of business; 
and imposing increased responsibilities on professional managers to enhance the separation of 
ownership and management. 
 
Besides, under the Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles adopted by TSE and GTSM 
for their listed companies, it is advisable to make it a first priority to set up the audit committees 
to be in charge of reviewing the accounting system, the financial condition, and major financial 
or business transactions, examining internal control system, and assessing and nominating 
outside auditors.  It is also advisable for listed companies to set up other special committees.  
However, these are only optional not compulsory requirements.  Thus, it may also reduce the 
accomplishment that would have been expected. 
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Chapter V 
    Impact of Changes of the U.S. Corporate Governance on Foreign Private 
Issuers Listed on the NYSE and Nasdaq 
A. Foreign Private Issuers Listed on the NYSE and Nasdaq 
By January 15, 2004, there were 467 foreign private issuers94 from 50 countries listed on the 
NYSE, 95  and the number is growing, not decreasing.  There are several reasons for foreign 
companies seeking to list their securities on national securities markets like the NYSE or Nasdaq.  
One is to obtain more efficient sources of capital from one of the biggest capital markets in the 
world, and the other is more important, by listing securities on the U.S. securities market to 
increase the credibility and confidence of investors to increase their stock value. 
 
We can see this benefit from companies like China Life Insurance Company Limited, which 
holds 45% of the life insurance market in China.  It listed its securities on NYSE on December 
17, 2003 and on its trading debut the stock price rose 27% in a single day.96  This benefit is also 
shown by Infosys Technologies Limited, an Indian developer of customized software company, 
which listed its securities on Nasdaq since March 1999.  Since its listing, Infosy’s share price has 
risen more than 500 percent. 97   Thus, being listed on the U.S. securities markets voluntarily 
subjects the company to more stringent restrictions of corporate governance but also benefits the 
foreign private issuers in obtaining more capital. 
                                                 
94 Foreign private issuers, as such term is defined in Rule 3b-4 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 means any 
foreign issuer other than a foreign government excluding companies with most of their shareholders, officers, assets, 
or business closely related to the U.S. 
95 See NYSE Complete list of Non-U.S. Listed Companies, available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/forlist040115.pdf  
96 Karen Talley, Bear Stearns, E*Trade Gain on Earnings News, December 18, 2003, Wall St. J., at C3.  
97 Supra note 85. 
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As stated, the S-O Act has been probably the most sweeping piece of reform legislation covering 
corporate governance of public companies in the U.S. since the 1930's, and a number of new 
reporting and corporate governance requirements are imposed on public companies, which 
generally comprises both U.S. companies and foreign private issuers.  Although there are some 
different treatments and exemptions for foreign private issuers under the SEC and SROs rules, 
the S-O Act in the end doesn’t expressly exclude its application on foreign private issuers or 
make any distinction between the U.S. and foreign private issuers. 
 
Thus, to follow the requirements provided in the S-O Act, such as the certification requirement 
of the CEO and the CFO, the loan prohibition, the audit committee, and auditor independence 
regulations and so on will do more than just increase the costs of foreign private issuers to access 
to the US securities markets.  It will also raise sovereignty concerns or might conflict or 
duplicate with the regulations of foreign issuers in their mother countries. 
 
Accordingly, on December 17, 2002, the SEC held two roundtable discussions on the 
international implications of proposed rules on auditor independence and attorney conduct.98  It 
also proposed and adopted releases, providing narrow exceptions or exemptions for foreign 
companies.  However, because Congress did not specifically provide exceptions for foreign 
private issuers in the S-O Act, the SEC has stated that it does not believe it has authority to draft 
broad exceptions for foreign issuers from provisions of the S-O Act.99  Thus, for an existing 
                                                 
98 See Auditor Independence Roundtable and Attorney Conduct Roundtable, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/audindtrans121702.htm.  
99 For a discussion of the application of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the SEC’s related rulemaking to foreign private 
issuers, see http://www.ffhsj.com/firmpubs.htm.  
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foreign private issuer or for one who has not yet been but is considering listing its securities on 
the U.S. securities markets, the issuer must make a careful evaluation of and advance planning 
for the potential impact of the new corporate governance regulations in the U.S. 
 
B. Impact of New Legislation on Foreign Private Issuer 
1. Federal Regulation 
As stated, since the S-O Act doesn’t expressly exclude the application on foreign countries, it 
doesn’t apply only to the U.S. public companies but also to foreign private issuers.100  To resolve 
such problems arising from the lack of express exemptions or different treatments under the S-O 
Act, the SEC made Rule 10A-3 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and in some releases, 
expressly provides different treatments for foreign private issuers from the application of the S-O 
Act.  But unless the SEC provides rules or releases to the contrary, the foreign private issuer 
would have to comply with the S-O Act as other U.S. domestic companies.  In complying with 
the new legislation, the following provisions  may require foreign private issuers to pay more 
attention to and make some changes in the procedures or internal settings concerning the 
corporate governance structure. 
 
a. CEO/CFO Certifications 
Section 302 and Section 906 of the S-O Act each require certifications by the CEO and the CFO 
of all public companies, including foreign private issuers.  The SEC has adopted rules 101 
requiring that the CEO and the CFO certify financial and other information contained in periodic 
                                                 
100 See Gerald S. Backman, Compliance with the New Corporate Governance Requirements, 1363 PLI/Corp 581, 
585 (2003). 
101 See SEC Release NOS. 33-8124, 34-46427, IC-25722. 
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reports filed with the SEC.  For foreign private issuers filing annual reports on Form 20-F or 40-
F,102 the certifications must be included in those annual reports. 
 
Because of the requirement of certifications by the CEO and the CFO, it will necessitate the 
establishment, maintenance and regular evaluation of the effectiveness of internal and disclosure 
controls and procedures to enable the CEO and the CFO to provide their certifications.  Some 
companies also have set up committees in charge of the internal and disclosure control systems 
or developed sub-certification procedures whereby subordinate officers and employees certify 
required information within their areas of responsibility in order to assist the CEO and the CFO 
in meeting their certification responsibilities. 
 
Thus, foreign private issuers in complying with the requirement of certifications by the CEO and 
the CFO accordingly must start implementing the internal and disclosure controls and procedures 
and begin conducting evaluations of such controls, so that the company will have all required 
controls and procedures in place and will be fully prepared for the required disclosures and 
certifications by the CEO and the CFO at the time of the filing their  annual reports on Form 20-F 
or 40-F with the SEC. 
 
b. Loan Prohibition 
One of the most controversial parts of applying the S-O Act to foreign private issuers is the 
requirement  of loan prohibition to directors and officers.  Under Section 402 of the S-O Act, it is 
                                                 
102 Form 20-F is used by foreign private issuers to either register a class of securities under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 or provide an annual report required under the Act. Form 40-F is used by foreign private issuers to file 
reports under the Act after having registered securities under the Securities Act of 1933 and by certain Canadian 
registrants. 
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unlawful for companies to directly or indirectly extend or maintain credit, to arrange for the 
extension of credit, or to renew any extension of credit in the form of a personal loan to or for 
any director or executive officer of the company. 
 
As stated in Part III, Section 402 does not expressly define what is a "personal loan" or an 
"extension of credit," so the prohibition of loans to directors and officers may also apply to some 
non-conventional arrangements.  Thus, in complying with this requirement, foreign private 
issuers should conduct a detailed review of all kinds of option exercise programs, employee 
benefit plans, and other related arrangements to determine if they involve loans or extensions of 
credit. 
 
c. Audit committee and Rule 10A-3 
Section 301 of the S-O Act requires all listed companies listed on the national securities 
exchanges to have aud it committees comprised solely of independent directors, which has been 
extremely controversial in some  foreign jurisdictions.  Not every foreign jurisdiction requires 
companies to have a designated audit committee, though they might have alternative governance 
structures that serve similar functions, such as supervisory boards or statutory auditors, which are 
as independent from management boards as independent directors.  Besides, the requirement that 
the audit committee consist only of independent directors might also incur some problems  in 
some countries like Germany, where the supervisory board must include employees who are by 
definition not independent. 103   In addition, the requirement that the audit committee be 
responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the outside auditors might also 
                                                 
103 See Robert C. Schwenkel, The Post-Enron Corporate Governance Environment: Where Are We Now, 1377 
PLI/Corp 11, 66 (2003). 
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incur problems in some jurisdictions like Japan, where the outside auditor would be retained only 
by the shareholders.104 
 
Facing such basic legal-structured contradictions among jurisdictions, the SEC proposed Rule 
10A-3 to provide a general exemption for foreign private issuers with securities listed on the 
national securities market from audit committee requirements of the S-O Act if the foreign 
private issuer meets the following requirements: (i) The foreign private issuer has a board of 
auditors (or similar body), or has statutory auditors, established and selected pursuant to home 
country legal or listing provisions expressly requiring or permitting such a board or similar body; 
(ii) The board or body, or statutory auditors are required under home country legal or listing 
requirements to be either separate from the board of directors, or composed of one or more 
members of the board of directors and one or more members that are not also members of the  
board of directors; (iii) The board or body, or statutory auditors, are not elected by management 
of such issuer and no executive officer of the foreign private issuer is a member of such board or 
body, or statutory auditors; (iv) Home country legal or listing provisions set forth or provide for 
standards for the independence of such board or body, or statutory auditors, from the foreign 
private issuer or the management of such issuer; (v) Such board or body, or statutory auditors, in 
accordance with any applicable home country legal or listing requirements or the issuer's 
governing documents, are responsible, to the extent permitted by law, for the appointment, 
retention and oversight of the work of any registered public accounting firm engaged (including,  
to the extent permitted by law, the resolution of disagreements between management and the 
auditor regarding financial reporting) for the purpose of preparing or issuing an audit report or 
performing other audit, review or attest services for the issuer; and (vi) The audit committee 
                                                 
104 Id. at 66. 
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requirements of paragraphs (b)(3), (b)(4) and (b)(5) of Rule 10A-3 apply to such board or body, 
or statutory auditors to the extent permitted by law. 
 
However, if the foreign private issuer cannot meet these general exemption requirements, there 
are still some individual exemptions provisions which may apply.  With respect to the 
requirement of independence of the audit committee for foreign private issuer, first, the SEC rule 
would permit non-management employees to sit on the audit committee if the employee is 
elected or named to the board of directors or the audit committee of the foreign private issuer 
pursuant to home country legal or listing requirements.  Second ly, it would permit one member 
of the audit committee of a foreign private issuer, if he is an affiliate of the foreign private issuer 
or a representative of such an affiliate, who has only observer status on, and is not a voting 
member or the chair of the audit committee, and neither the member nor the affiliate is an 
executive officer of the foreign private issuer.   Thirdly, it would permit one member of the audit 
committee of a foreign private issuer to be a representative or designee of a foreign government 
or foreign governmental entity that is an affiliate of the foreign private issuer, who is not an 
executive officer of the foreign private issuer. 
 
Besides, the SEC clarified in Rule10A-3 that in the case where a foreign private issuer has a two-
tier board of directors, the term “board of directors” means the supervisory or non-management 
board.  Accordingly, that board could either form a separate audit committee or, if the entire 
supervisory or non-management board was independent within the provisions and exceptions of 
the rule, the entire board could be designated as the audit committee. 
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If foreign private issuers avail themselves of the exemptions  under Rule 10A-3, they have to 
disclose their reliance on the exemptions and their assessment of whether, and if so how, such 
reliance would materially and adversely affect the ability of their audit committee to act 
independently and to satisfy the other requirements of the SEC rule.  Such disclosure must 
appear in, or be incorporated by reference into, the annual reports on Forms 20-F and 40-F as 
well as proxy statements or information statements for shareholders’ meetings at which elections 
for directors are held. 
 
d. Financial Experts on the Audit Committee 
The S-O Act and the SEC rules require disclosure of whether there is any financial expert on the 
audit committee in the annual reports, and there is no exception for foreign private issuers.  
However, since requiring an audit committee financial expert to possess expertise relating to U.S. 
GAAP could further burden foreign private issuers who use home country accounting principles 
or international accounting standards to prepare their primary financial statements, the SEC rule 
added an instruction to clarify that the audit committee financial expert’s understanding must be 
of the GAAP used by the foreign private issuer in preparing its primary financial statements filed 
with the SEC.105  It is also required that foreign private issuers that do not prepare their primary 
financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP most include a reconciliation to those 
principles in the financial statements that they file with the SEC.  Moreover, in conjunction with 
Rule 10a-3, it is not required under the SEC rules that a foreign private issuer disclose whether 
its audit committee financial expert is independent.  
 
e. Non-Audit Services of Accounting Firm 
                                                 
105 See SEC Release NOS. 33-8177; 34-47235. 
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Under Section 201 of the S-O Act, it is unlawful for a public accounting firm to 
contemporaneously provide its clients with audit and a variety of non-audit services.  As for 
permitted non-audit services, including tax services, they may be provided by an accounting firm 
if they are approved in advance by the audit committee of the company.  The SEC rule also 
requires that engagements be subject to detailed pre-approval policies and procedures established 
by the audit committee, provided that the audit committee is informed of each service and the 
policies and procedures do not constitute delegation of the audit committee's responsibilities to 
management.106 
 
Thus, foreign private issuers should conduct a review of all services provided by outside auditors 
to make sure that prohibited non-audit services have totally ceased by the end of the 
grandfathered period.  In addition, in light of the requirement for pre-approval of all auditor 
services by the audit committee, it should specifically pre-approve both audit and permitted non-
audit services provided by the outside auditors. 
 
f. Disclosure Controls 
As with the certification requirement stated above, the disclosure controls requirement has 
focused on companies’ internal disclosure processes.  Amongst which, the CEO and the CFO are 
required to assess their companies’ disclosure controls prior to the filing of periodic reports and 
publicly disclose the results of the evaluations.  This requires the CEO and the CFO to take 
responsibilities for disclosure and makes it more difficult for them to disclaim knowledge of their 
company’s disclosure. 
 
                                                 
106 See SEC Release NO. 33-8183; 34-47265; 35-27642; IC-25915; IA-2103, FR-68. 
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Under the S-O Act, the SEC has adopted new rules which require all public companies including 
foreign private issuers to maintain “disclosure controls and procedures,” which are designed to 
ensure that all material information about the business will be known by those individuals 
responsible for preparing the company’s public disclosure. 107   Even though the SEC has not 
mandated or identified any specific set of disclosure controls, it has recommended, not mandated, 
in various releases that the company set up a committee, which could be responsible for 
establishing and supervising the company’s entire disclosure process, developing procedures for 
funneling information to the committee, and considering the materiality of information and 
determining disclosure obligation on a timely basis. 
 
g. Off-Balance Sheet Transaction Disclosures 
Foreign private issuers would also have to comply with the disclosure requirements of the off-
balance sheet transaction in the annual and quarterly reports provided in Section 401 of the S-O 
Act and by the SEC rules 108  about off-balance sheet arrangement disclosed in the MD&A.  
Several items in the definition of “off-balance sheet” arrangement refer to U.S. GAPP.  In 
general, foreign private issuer’s MD&A disclosure should just focus on its primary financial 
statements and include a discussion of the reconciliation to U.S. GAPP, if it is necessary for an 
understanding of the financial statements as a whole.  However, to identify the types of 
arrangements which are subject to disclosure under the SEC rule above, a foreign private issuer 
must assess its guarantee contracts and variable interests pursuant to U.S. GAPP. 
 
h. Non-GAAP Financial Measure Disclosure 
                                                 
107 See SEC Release NOS. 33-8238; 34-47986; IC-26068. 
108 See SEC Release Nos. 33-8182; 34-47264; FR-67;  International Series Release No. 1266. 
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As stated in Part III, the SEC adopted a new disclosure regulation, Regulation G, requiring 
public companies to disclose or release such non-GAAP financial measures, including in that 
disclosure or release a presentation of the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure and 
a reconciliation of the disclosed non-GAAP financial measure to the most directly comparable 
GAAP financial measure.  However, the SEC made a significant distinction that will permit 
many foreign private issuers to use press releases and other information without being subject to 
Regulation G. 109  A foreign private issuer is exempted from Regulation G if (i) the securities of 
the company are listed or quoted on a securities exchange or inter-dealer quotation system 
outside the U.S., (ii) the non-GAAP financial measure is not derived from or based on a measure 
calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP, and (iii) the disclosure is made by or on 
behalf of the company outside the U.S.  The exceptions above focus on whether the financial 
measure relates to U.S. GAAP and whether the disclosure is made by or on behalf of the foreign 
private issuer outside of the United States.  This is a balance of the interests of U.S. investors and 
the interests of foreign private issuers in communicating globally, including in their home 
markets. 
 
In addition to Regulation G, the SEC also amended Form 20-F of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 to incorporate Item 10 of Regulation S-K, which is similar to but tougher than Regulation 
G, to impose requirements concerning the use of non-GAAP financial measures in an SEC filing.  
Accordingly, foreign private issuers will be subject to the same requirements as domestic issuers 
with respect to the use of non-GAAP financial measures in filings with the SEC on Form 20-F.  
However, filing Form 40-F is not subject to those requirements. 
 
                                                 
109 See SEC Release No. 33-8176; 34-47226; FR-65. 
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i. Code of Ethics 
Pursuant to the S-O Act, the SEC adopted rules110  providing that foreign private issuers are 
required to disclose in their annual reports on Form 20-F and 40-F whether they have adopted a 
written code of ethics that applies to the company’s CEO, CFO, principal accounting officer or 
controller, or people performing similar functions, and the changes or waivers of the code of 
ethics.  However, in contrast to U.S. domestic companies, foreign private issuers don’t have to 
provide in a current report “immediate disclosure” of any change to, or waiver from, the 
company’s code of ethics for its senior financial officers and CEO.  Nevertheless, the SEC 
strongly encourages prompt disclosure by foreign private issuers under cover of Form 6-K or on 
the foreign private issuers’ websites.111 
 
2. SRO Listing requirement 
a. NYSE Rule 
Generally, the NYSE rules do not apply to foreign private issuers.  Under NYSE rule Section 
303A(11), foreign private issuers are allowed to follow home country practice in lieu of the new 
requirements, except that such companies would be required to: (1) have an audit committee that 
satisfies the requirements of Rule 10A-3; (2) notify the NYSE in writing after any executive 
officer becomes aware of any non-compliance with any applicable provision; and (3) provide a 
brief, general summary of the significant ways in which its governance differs from those 
followed by domestic companies under NYSE listing standards. 
 
                                                 
110 See SEC Release NOS. 33-8177; 34-47235. 
111 See SEC Release NOS. 33-8177; 34-47235. 
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Section 303A(11) also demands listed foreign private issuers to disclose any significant ways in 
which their corporate governance practices differ from those followed by domestic companies 
under the NYSE listing standards.  The disclosure may be provided either on the issuer’s website 
(provided in English) and/or in their annual report distributed to U.S. shareholders.  If it is only 
provided on the website, the annual report must state and provide the website address. 
 
b. Nasdaq Rule 
NASD Rule 4350 currently provides that foreign issuers are not required to do any act that is 
contrary to a law, rule or regulation of any public authority exercising jurisdiction over such 
issuer or that is contrary to generally accepted business practices in the issuer's country of 
domicile.  Nasdaq rules also provide exemptions from the requirements of NASD Rule 4350 as 
may be necessary or appropriate to carry out this intent.  Nasdaq also proposes to provide that a 
foreign issuer that receives an exemption from NASD Rule 4350 would be required to disclose 
in its annual reports filed with the SEC each requirement from which it is exempted and describe 
the home country practice, if any, followed by the foreign private issuer in lieu of these 
requirements.  In addition, a foreign issuer making its initial public offering or first U.S. listing 
on Nasdaq would be required to disclose any such exemptions in their registration statement.  
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Chapter VI 
Conclusion 
The importance of good corporate governance structure is the more efficient access to capital for 
companies.  Since better corporate governance would lead to higher returns on equity and greater 
efficiency, it has been addressed around the world.  However, it is important to realize that there 
is no one perfect model of corporate governance suitable to every country.  It would be different 
and changed by time, history, and existing legal grounds.  But due to the globalization and 
integration of financial and capital markets, it seems inevitable for companies to adjust 
themselves to the most influential corporate governance model nowadays.  And it also 
encourages governments to establish or revise their regulatory schemes for better corporate 
governance structures to maintain investors’ confidence in securities markets. 
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